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BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah 
Constitution Art. VIII, 3; Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(j) (Repl. 
Vol. 1987); and Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of 
law that cross-appellant/intervenor-defendant Edward L. Gillmor 
(hereinafter "Edward L. Gillmor") was not entitled to an easement 
by implication over the Sawmill Canyon Road across property owned 
by plaintiff Shirley Gillmor (hereinafter "Shirley Gillmor")? 
The trial court refused to award the easement based on 
"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel." (R. 885.) Because the court's 
holding was a conclusion of law, this Court need accord it no 
deference but should review it for correctness.1 Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the trial court err in holding as a matter of 
law that Edward L. Gillmor was not entitled to an easement by 
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road across property owned by 
Shirley Gillmor? The court held this claim was barred by 
"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel." (R. 885.) The court's 
holding was a conclusion of law and this Court need accord it no 
deference but should review it for correctness. Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
3. Was trial court's finding that the trial court in 
the Partition Action "did not intend to provide Edward Gillmor 
and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded to Florence 
Gillmor" (Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884) clearly erroneous as 
against the weight of the evidence? This is a question of fact, 
the standard of review for which allows reversal if the finding 
is clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the 
1
 The lower court designated its holding that the Edward L. 
Gillmor's claims are barred by "traditional notions of finality" as 
a finding of fact. The holding is in reality a conclusion of law 
and this Court should not accord it any added deference simply 
because it was denominated a finding of fact. State v. Rio Vista 
Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990). 
-2-
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evidence. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P. 2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1989); 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
4. Did the trial court err in refusing to reform or 
correct the description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the 
Partition Decree on the grounds of mutual mistake? This issue 
involves mixed questions of fact and law. The issue of fact is 
whether the trial court in the Partition Action intended to deny 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor access to their property 
across the property awarded to Florence Gillmor, addressed in the 
preceding paragraph. The issue of law is whether the lower 
court, sitting as a court in equity, has the power to consider an 
independent action in equity brought under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to reform or modify a legal description 
caused by a mutual mistake of fact where the action was brought 
several years after the entry of the decree containing the 
mistake. The issue of law should be reviewed for correctness, no 
deference being accorded to the trial court's conclusions. 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
5. Did the trial court properly hold that Shirley 
Gillmor is- not entitled to a private easement of access across 
defendants' property for persons who had purchased big game 
permits to hunt big game on her property and in holding further 
that Shirley Gillmor is not entitled to injunctive relief and 
damages? Because the hunting issue will be addressed by 
-3-
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defendant Wright and intervenor-defendant Charles F. Gillmor, 
this Brief will not specifically consider that issue. Edward L. 
Gillmor joins in any Brief filed by Wright and Charles F. Gillmor 
in connection with the hunting issue. 
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION 
There are no Constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation is 
believed to be determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a cross-appeal from the lower court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 876-88) and Judgment (R. 889-
90) dismissing Edward L. Gillmor's Counterclaim. Shirley Gillmor 
commenced this action seeking injunctive relief and damages from 
the Wrights. Charles F. Gillmor and Edward L. Gillmor were 
allowed to intervene as defendants and to bring Counterclaims 
against Shirley Gillmor seeking an award of an easement over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses Shirley Gillmor's property. 
(R. 656-78.) 
B. Disposition of the Case Below. 
Edward L. Gillmor filed a Counterclaim in Intervention, 
pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and order of the court 
(R. 765-69.) The action was tried before the lower court, 
sitting without a jury, on September 20-21, 1988. The court 
-4-
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issued its Summary Decision on November 29, 1988. (R. 771-86.) 
The court entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law 
and its Judgment dismissing all claims on May 19, 1989. (R. 876-
90.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Introduction. 
The Counterclaims of Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. 
Gillmor seek an order reversing the trial court and ordering that 
they should be awarded an easement by implication and by 
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses property 
owned by Shirley Gillmor. They also seek an order reforming the 
legal description of the road contained in the Judgment and 
Decree of Partition entered by the court in a prior action 
between the parties, based on an error contained in the 
description caused by the mutual mistake of the parties. 
2. The Sawmill Property. 
The action tried in the lower court focuses on a parcel 
of real property, known as the Sawmill property, located in 
Summit County consisting of approximately 5139 acres. Shirley 
Gillmor's predecessor in interest, Florence Gillmor, together 
with Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor at one time owned 
the entire Sawmill property as tenants in common. They also 
owned numerous other properties located in Salt Lake, Tooele, 
-5-
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Wasatch, and Summit Counties consisting of approximately 34,000 
acres. 
In 1974, Edward L. Gillmor and his wife commenced an 
action against Florence Gillmor and against Charles F. Gillmor 
and his wife, in the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, Civil No, 223998, seeking partition of all of the 
approximately 34,000 acres of property jointly owned by the 
parties (the "Partition Action"). On February 17, 1981, 
following a lengthy trial, the lower court issued a Judgment and 
Decree of Partition (the "Partition Decree") which partitioned 
the Sawmill property into four separate parcels.2 (Finding of 
Fact No. 7, R. 880; Exhibit 33; Trial transcript, Vol. I, at 
25. )3 The Partition Decree awarded fee ownership for each 
parcel of the Sawmill Property as follows: 
2
 The Partition Action was tried initially in 1977 and 
appealed to this Court, as Case No. 15457. In an unpublished 
opinion dated March 23, 1979, this Court remanded the case to the 
trial court because the case was "only half tried." The trial 
court was directed to take additional evidence relating to the 
appurtenant rights pertaining to the parcels that had been 
partitioned. The Court's opinion of March 23, 1979, was admitted 
into evidence at the trial of the present action as Exhibit D-55. 
3
 The record before the Court includes transcripts of the 
hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order (R. 934) 
and the hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction (R. 
936). For purposes of clarification, the trial transcript will be 
referred to in this brief by the notation "Tr." References to the 
other transcripts will identify the hearing and the date of the 
transcript. The trial transcript identified as R. 937 will not be 
referred to in this brief. The two larger transcripts, dated 
September 20 and 21, will be referred to as Volumes II and III, 
respectively. 
-6-
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Parcel No. 1, Charles F. Gillmor. 
Parcel No. 2, Edward L. Gillmor. 
Parcel No. 3, Florence Gillmor. 
Parcel No. 4, Florence Gillmor. 
(Finding of Fact Nos. 1-3, 7, R. 880; Exhibit 2, pp. 25-26; 
Exhibit 33, pp. 58-60; Tr. Vol. I, at 25. )4 The trial court's 
decision in the Partition Action was.affirmed by this Court. 657 
P.2d 736 (Utah 1982). 
The partition of the property was illustrated on the 
two maps introduced into evidence, Exhibits 1 and 30. A copy of 
a topographical map covering the Sawmill property, identical to 
Exhibit 1, showing the division of the property between the 
parties is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The attached map also 
shows the Sawmill Canyon Road and other stock roads and trails 
used by Edward L. Gillmor prior to the Partition Action. 
3. The Access Awarded Under 
the Partition Decree. 
After describing the portions of the Sawmill property 
awarded to each party, the Partition"Decree provided that "[a] 
roadway and stock trail easement is reserved," following which a 
metes and bounds description is given. (Exhibit 2, at 25-26.) 
A
 The property awarded to Florence Gillmor was subsequently 
conveyed over time to Stephen T. Gillmor and/or his wife, Shirley 
Gillmor. At the time of trial, the portion of the Sawmill property 
awarded to Florence Gillmor was entirely owned by plaintiff Shirley 
Gillmor. (Finding of Fact No. 8, R. 880.) 
-7-
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The easement, which follows part of the Sawmill Canyon Road, does 
not give Edward L. Gillmor or Charles F. Gillmor access by the 
road to the eastern portions of their property. The easement 
terminates in the middle of the property awarded to Florence 
Gillmor. At the trial, Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., (the son of 
defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor, also known as "Luke") identified 
the place where the easement described in the Partition Decree 
terminates by making an "X" on Exhibit 30 and writing the word 
"Decree" in black ink. (Tr. Vol. I, at 63.) He testified that 
he believed the description of the easement to be in error 
because it did not give his father the right of access over the 
entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road to the eastern portions of 
the property awarded to him in a way that would allow the 
property to be used for grazing. (Tr. Vol. I, at 63-65.) 
4. The Sawmill Canyon Road. 
The Sawmill Canyon Road provides the only reasonable 
access from the state highway to the respective parcels owned by 
the parties. The Sawmill Canyon Road is a steep road that 
follows the bottom of Sawmill Canyon up to a point at the top of 
the mountain which is on Shirley Gillmor's property. Sawmill 
Canyon, through which the road runs, is a narrow canyon with 
steep walls and cliffs on both sides of the road. The cliffs 
cannot be crossed by vehicles or livestock. From the mouth of 
Sawmill Canyon, the road first traverses the property owned by 
-8-
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the Wrights and then rises rapidly as it crosses the western 
portions of the property of Charles F. Gillmor, Edward L. 
Gillmor, and Shirley Gillmor, in that order.512 After passing 
onto Shirley Gillmor's property, in a northerly direction, the 
Sawmill Canyon Road runs in a northeasterly direction and then 
turns to the south running back across the eastern portions of 
property owned by Edward L. Gillmor and Frank Gillmor along 
Thirtyfive Canyon. (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. 879-80.) 
At the trial, Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., identified the 
original Sawmill Canyon Road in red ink on Exhibit 30. (Tr. Vol. 
I, at 26-27.) He further testified that he and his father had 
made additional roads with a bulldozer on the Sawmill property 
after they purchased it in 1967, which were identified on Exhibit 
30 in blue ink. (Tr. Vol. I, at 27.) The Sawmill Canyon Road, 
and other stock trails traditionally used, are shown on the map 
attached hereto as Exhibit A in both red and blue ink, as 
indicated on Exhibit 30. 
Historically, the Sawmill Canyon Road has been used for 
many years for the purpose of trailing livestock over the Sawmill 
property, for hauling supplies, inspecting the grazing livestock, 
and inspecting the property. The Sawmill Canyon Road provided 
Photographs of certain portions of the road were 
introduced at the hearing on the preliminary injunction held on 
September 25, 1987, as Exhibits P-9 through 21. (Transcript of 
preliminary injunction hearing 9-25-87, R. 936, at 46-52.) 
-9-
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the sole access to the eastern portion of the property. For many 
years the parties regularly used the Sawmill Canyon Road, as did 
their predecessors and others to whom the property was leased for 
ranching and livestock purposes. (Tr. Vol. I, at 30-31, 37, 78-
80, 137.) 
The trial court made the following finding regarding 
the historical use of the Sawmill Canyon Road: 
The Gillmor family, for many years prior to 
December, 1986, used the Sawmill Canyon Road 
to obtain access to their property for 
themselves, their employees and their guests 
to transport and tend livestock, to perform 
maintenance or construct improvements on the 
property, and for big game hunting by the 
family, employees and guests, but not 
including access for persons holding permits 
from the landowners to hunt big game. The 
road has historically carried a variety of 
vehicles including trucks, sheep camps, heavy 
equipment and recreational vehicles, and has 
been travelled by persons on foot and on 
horseback. 
(Finding of Fact No. 10, R. 881.) 
5. The Sawmill Canyon Road Provides the Only 
Access to the Eastern Portions of the 
Property Awarded to Edward L. Gillmor and 
Charles F. Gillmor for Grazing Purposes. 
Edward L. Gillmor has traditionally used the Sawmill 
property for livestock operations, such as grazing cattle and 
sheep. (Tr. Vol. I, at 22, 29.) Because the Sawmill Canyon is 
very steep with mountainous and rugged terrain, the only access 
that Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have to the eastern 
-10-
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portions of their respective parcels is along the Sawmill Canyon 
Road. The trial court made the following finding: 
Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor do not 
have traditional grazing access to eastern 
portions of their Sawmill parcels unless they 
are allowed access over parcels awarded to 
Florence Gillmor and now owned by Shirley 
Gillmor. 
(Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884.) 
In spite of this finding, the trial court held that 
neither Edward L. Gillmor nor Charles F. Gillmor was entitled to 
an easement to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses 
Shirley Gillmor's property to gain access to the eastern portions 
of their property. The trial court's holding was founded on 
"traditional notions of finality inherent in the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel." (Finding of Fact No. 32, R. 
885. ) 
The Court's finding that the only access that Edward L. 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have to the eastern portions of 
their property is over the Sawmill Canyon Road was supported by 
ample evidence introduced at trial. (Tr. Vol. I, at 30-31, 37, 
78-80, 137.) Because Shirley Gillmor claimed at the trial that 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor had access to the 
eastern portions of their property through Pine Canyon or through 
Thirtyfive Canyon, the trial court personally examined the 
property. In its Memorandum Decision, the court stated: 
-11-
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In addition to being presented with 
testimonial evidence, the court inspected the 
premises, traversed in a four-wheel drive 
vehicle the length of Sawmill Canyon Road, 
viewed each end of 35 Canyon and walked the 
length of Pine Canyon. This evidence 
persuaded the court that intervenors do not 
have traditional grazing access to the 
eastern portions of their own parcels unless 
they are allowed access over the parcels 
awarded to plaintiff. 
35 Canyon is not accessible for grazing 
from the south. Consequently, access over 
intervenors' own land to eastern portions 
must be through Pine Canyon. Stock in 
limited numbers and in single file can be 
moved from the Sawmill Canyon Road through 
Pine Canyon to the eastern grazing area. 
Moving the stock back down Pine Canyon is 
even more limited, difficult and treacherous. 
Herding stock through Pine Canyon, then, does 
not constitute traditional grazing access. 
This is consistent with the testimony of 
Richard Huffman in the second partition 
trial. Mr. Huffman did not even consider 
Pine Canyon for access. Additionally, earth 
moving equipment cannot create a stock trail 
through Pine Canyon for traditional grazing 
access. The evidence did establish, however, 
that as many as 150 head of cattle can be 
moved the length of the Sawmill Canyon Road 
over plaintiff's parcels to the eastern 
portions of intervener's parcels in less than 
a full day. 
(Summary Decision, at 11-12, R. 781-82.) The court's findings 
were memorialized in Findings of Fact Nos. 25-26. (R. 883-84.) 
The lower court's findings regarding accessibility through Pine 
Canyon or through Thirtyfive Canyon were supported by ample 
testimony presented at trial. (Tr. Vol. I, at 32-35, 37-38, 45-
46, 137, 144.) 
-12-
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The evidence was virtually undisputed that, without the 
right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses Shirley 
Gillmor's property, Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor have 
no other practical way to move sheep and cattle to the eastern 
portions of their property. Without vehicular access over 
Shirley Gillmor's property via the Sawmill Canyon Road, 80 
percent of the 1284 acres awarded to Edward L. Gillmor is 
unusable, making the property "nearly completely worthless" (Tr. 
Vol. I, 36.) Having no right to use the road "would terminate" 
his cattle and livestock operation on the property. (Tr. Vol. I, 
at 47.) Similarly, 98 percent of Charles F. Gillmor's property 
is useless without access over the road in its entirety. (Tr. 
Vol I, at 137.) 
6. The Error in the Description of the Easement 
in the Partition Decree. 
The primary issue in the Partition Action was how to 
divide all of the properties owned in common by the parties and 
which particular theory of partition ought to be utilized.6 The 
6
 This Court described the issues in the Partition Action 
in its 1982 opinion: 
The major dispute is whether the property 
should be partitioned in kind according to the 
cotenants' pro rata share of the value of the 
land so as to permit plaintiffs to continue 
operation of their cattle ranch in a similar 
manner to which they have heretofore operated 
it (plaintiffs' plan), or whether the acreage 
should be partitioned in kind with each 
(continued...) 
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issue of access was undisputed. All parties assumed that, 
whichever theory of partition was followed, they would be given 
full access to the property awarded to them, Florence Gillmor 
and Charles F. Gillmor jointly filed a "Petition Relating to 
Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning Land," in 1976 in which 
they requested the court to divide each parcel at issue into four 
equal parcels with "cross easements to be awarded all parties to 
provide traditional means of access to each tract." (Exhibit D-
50, at 1.) Rights of access were never disputed in the Partition 
Action. 
During the first trial in the Partition Action, the 
parties and their counsel traveled over the Sawmill Canyon Road 
to the top of the plateau, for the purpose of inspecting the 
property and the available access. (Tr. Vol. I, at 49-50, 76, 
129-32. )7 Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., and Charles F. Gillmor, who 
6(...continued) 
cotenant receiving his prorata share of the 
acreage (defendants' plan). The trial court 
chose the latter, and plaintiffs appeal. 
637 P.2d at 737. 
7
 Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., placed an asterisk on Exhibit 30 
and wrote the word "Trip" at the spot where the parties and their 
counsel stopped during their trip to the Sawmill property during 
the Partition Action. (Tr. Vol. I, at 53.) When the court made 
its inspection of the property during the trial of the present 
case, the vehicle stopped at approximately the same spot. (Tr. Vol 
II, at 44-45.) 
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were adversaries in the Partition Action (Tr. Vol. I, at 128), 
were both present during the trip. Both testified at the trial 
of the present action that there was a mutual agreement between 
the parties during the trip that, regardless of how the Sawmill 
property was partitioned, access would be available by the 
Sawmill Canyon Road. (Tr. Vol. I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148, 
162. ) 
During the Partition Action in 1977, following the trip 
to the Sawmill property, Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor 
submitted a proposal entitled "Proposed Division of Appurtenant 
Rights" which, significantly, proposed that the access to the 
Sawmill property be available for all of the parties along the 
entirety of the Sawmill property. (Exhibit D-44; Tr. Vol. I, at 
70-71. )8 Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor also submitted 
with the proposal a "Motion" requesting that the court "view the 
easements as items of continuing jurisdiction." (Exhibit D-51.) 
After remand following the first appeal, a second trial 
was held in 1980, during which counsel for Charles F. Gillmor 
introduced Exhibit 113-D (marked as Exhibit D-46 in the present 
8
 At the trial of the present action, Edward L. Gillmor, 
Jr., plotted the description contained in Exhibit D-44 on the map, 
Exhibit 30, using black ink. The road described in the Exhibit D-
44 terminated on the eastern portion of the property awarded to 
Edward L. Gillmor. (Tr. Vol. I, at 70-71.) Charles F. Gillmor, 
whose lawyer prepared Exhibit D-44 during the Partition Action, 
agreed with Edward L. Gillmor, Jr.'s testimony regarding the 
plotting of the description contained in Exhibit D-44. (Tr. Vol. 
I, at 132. ) 
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case) which purported to give a detailed description of all 
access roads and rights of way for all of the properties at issue 
in the Partition Action. The exhibit was admitted by stipulation 
of counsel on the condition that it would be subject to 
modification if it was not reasonable. A copy of the trial 
transcript reflecting the stipulation was admitted as Exhibit D-
47 in the present action. The description contained in Exhibit 
113-D was eventually used in the Partition Decree (Exhibit 2, at 
26. ) 
Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the present case) was in 
error. It described only a portion of the Sawmill Canyon Road 
and terminated in the middle of the property awarded to Florence 
Gillmor, approximately one mile from the southern border of her 
property. (Tr. Vol. I, at 62-64.) At the trial of the present 
action, Charles F. Gillmor testified that the description 
prepared by his lawyer in Exhibit D-46 was an error and was not 
what was intended by the parties. (Tr. Vol. I, at 136.) Under 
the description prepared by his lawyer, Charles F. Gillmor has 
access to approximately five acres of the 1284 acres awarded to 
him and has no access for livestock purposes. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
137.) He testified in the present case that he left the matter 
of the description up to his lawyer who, apparently, failed to 
catch the mistake. (Tr. Vol. I, at 138-39.) Edward L. Gillmor, 
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Jr., confirmed that the description was an error. (Tr. Vol. I, 
at 63.) 
Prior to his death, Shirley Gillmor's decedent, Stephen 
T. Gillmor, gave evidence that the Sawmill Canyon Road provided 
the only access to the Sawmill property. At the first trial of 
the Partition Action, he testified that all parties would have to 
have access by way of the road: 
Q. [By Mr. Lee] With respect to the 
various parcels, if a division were to be 
made by this Court, would it be necessary to 
have access up the road you've referred to 
across the various parcels? Would that 
access have to be available to all parties? 
A. Definitely so. The topography is 
so steep and rugged in the rear portion of 
this it is the only vehicle access into the 
area. 
So very definitely, this access would be 
— have to be left open for all parties to 
make use of the parcel. 
(Transcript of First Trial in Partition Action, at 335).9 No 
evidence was introduced at the trial of this action that Florence 
Gillmor had a different intent during the Partition Action. 
9
 Quoted in Edward L. Gillmor's Post-Trial Memorandum (R. 
762), at 3, and by counsel during closing argument. (Tr. Vol. II, 
at 179.) The lower court in the present case agreed to take 
judicial notice of the entire court file in the Partition Action, 
on the motion of Shirley Gillmor's counsel, to which no objection 
was made. (Tr. Vol. I, at 11-13.) The quoted portion of the 
transcript was submitted to the trial court in the present case by 
counsel for Shirley Gillmor. (Tr. Vol. II, at 179-80.) 
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7. Inconsistencies Between the Descriptions in 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and the Partition Decree. 
Although the Partition Decree utilized the erroneous 
description contained in Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the 
present case), the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued 
in the Partition Action contained a different description of the 
easement, more consistent with the intent of the parties.10 In 
the Findings of Fact, at p. 21, the trial court in the Partition 
Action made the following finding describing the Sawmill 
property: 
Acres: 5139 more less 
Division: Each 1284.75 acres more or less. 
Equal in quantity and quality. 
Division into parcels will not 
decrease value of the whole. Can 
be partitioned without great 
prejudice to owners. 
Present Use: Grazing. 
Highest and Best Use: Grazing and 
recreational. 
Improvements: Fencing, stock ponds, corrals. 
Stock Trails: Across Wright property to 
get to grazing land, Thirtyfive 
Canyon. See access. 
Water: Developed springs in Sections 21, 23, 26; 
10
 The Findings and Conclusions in the Partition Action were 
admitted as Exhibit 33 in the present action. The page from the 
Findings and Conclusions containing the description of the easement 
was also received as Exhibit 31 in the present case. 
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spring in Sawmill Canyon Section 
33. 
Access: On existing road from 1-15 
frontage road across Wright 
property in mouth of Sawmill 
Canyon. 
At the trial of the present case, Edward L. Gillmor, 
Jr., testified that the description quoted above was 
consistent with the access he and his father had always used 
on the property and with the intent of the parties that access 
be given over the entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 65-69.) He testified further that the description 
at page 21 of the Findings of Fact were inconsistent with the 
description of the right of way in the Partition Decree, which 
only described part of the road. (Tr. Vol. I, at 114-15.)n 
8. Richard Huffman's Mistake in Describing 
the Road. 
The description of the road in the Partition Decree 
(Exhibit 2) and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(Exhibit 33) were prepared by Richard Huffman, who had been 
hired by Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor as an expert 
in the Partition Action. (Tr. Vol. I, at 149-50, 215.) He 
testified in the present case that,-in connection with the 
first trial of the Partition Action, he was charged with 
11
 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the 
Partition Action, at 60, also contained a legal description of the 
property identical to the description ultimately used in the 
Partition Decree. 
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dividing up the various parcels based on "[e]qual acreage and 
equal usability." (Tr. Vol. I, at 192.)12 At the second 
trial, his charge included preparing easement descriptions. 
(Tr. Vol. I, at 193-94.) He prepared the description of the 
Sawmill Canyon Road used in Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the 
present case), which was subsequently used in the Partition 
Decree. He did so at the request of Charles F. Gillmor's 
lawyer. (Tr. Vol. I, at 194.) 
Huffman's testimony in the present case showed that 
his description used in the Partition Action was based on two 
erroneous assumptions. He assumed that cattle could be moved 
onto the Sawmill property from the state highway through the 
south end of Thirtyfive Canyon. (Tr. Vol. I, at 212, 218. )13 
Huffman also assumed that there was a livestock right of way 
from the highway to the mouth of Thirtyfive Canyon, across the 
Wright's property. (Tr. Vol. I, at 219-21.) 
Both of these assumptions were in error. The trial 
court in the present case specifically found that there is no 
access for grazing from the south entrance to Thirtyfive 
12
 Huffman testified in the present case that he divided the 
Sawmill Property so as to arrive at four parcels of equal usability 
for the "highest and best use of the land," which he determined was 
grazing and "some limited recreational value." (Tr. Vol. I, at 
207, 215.) 
13
 During the Partition Action, Huffman observed the Sawmill 
property twice from aircraft, and once from the highway. (Tr. Vol. 
I, at 197.) 
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Canyon. (Finding of Fact No. 26, R. 884.)14 Further, there 
is no access to the bottom of Thirtyfive Canyon over the 
Wright's property. Dennis Wright, who owns the property 
between the Gillmor property and the highway, testified that 
there is no livestock right-of-way access across his land to 
Thirtyfive Canyon. (Tr. Vol. II, at 61.) On cross-
examination in the present case, Huffman admitted that there 
is no access to Thirtyfive Canyon across the Wright property. 
(Tr. Vol. I, at 222.) 
Asked to assume that there was no access to the 
Sawmill property through Thirty-five Canyon, as the trial 
court subsequently found, Huffman conceded that there would be 
no access to the property from the highway. Nor was he aware 
of any easement to cross the Wright property to the mouth of 
Thirtyfive Canyon. (Tr. Vol. I, at 220-25.) Thus, the 
description of the road in the Partition Decree was in error. 
It did not give Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor 
access to their property for grazing purposes. Huffman's 
testimony was consistent with the trial court's finding in the 
present case that without the use of the Sawmill Canyon Road, 
neither Edward L. Gillmor nor Charles F. Gillmor would have 
14
 Edward L. Gillmor, Jr., similarly testified that there 
was no access from the south end of Thirtyfive Canyon which is 
"almost vertical." (Tr. Vol. I, at 37-38.) 
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access for grazing purposes to their property. (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 25-27, R. 883-84.) 
9. Discovery of the Mistake in the 
Description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in 
the Partition Decree. 
The error in the description of the road in the 
Partition Decree remained undiscovered by Edward L. Gillmor 
until 1987. Following the Partition Decree, Edward L. Gillmor 
believed that he had the right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road 
to gain access to the eastern portion of his property. After 
the entry of the decree, until 1983; he made no use of the 
Sawmill property pursuant to a stipulation under which Stephen 
T. Gillmor was given the sole right to use the property. (Tr. 
Vol. I, at 41.) After 1983 Edward L. Gillmor used his portion 
of the Sawmill property to graze horses and, after 1987, 
cattle.15 He gained access to his property by using the 
Sawmill Canyon Road, as he had traditionally done, believing 
that he had the right to use the road and because there was no 
other access. (Tr. Vol. I, at 41-42, 65, 122-23.) 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor did not 
discover the error in the legal description of the Sawmill 
Canyon Road until the preliminary injunction hearing held on 
September 25, 1987, when they heard Stephen T. Gillmor testify 
15
 In 1987, the property between Edward L. Gillmor and 
Shirley Gillmor was fenced, which allowed the property to be used 
for the grazing of cattle. (Tr. Vol. I, at 43-44.) 
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that neither Edward nor Charles Gillmor had access over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road from the gate onward. (Tr. Vol. I, at 
111-12, 123, 139.)16 After hearing that testimony, Edward L. 
Gillmor retained legal counsel to pursue his claims that he 
should have the right to use the road. (Tr. Vol. I, at 65.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. All of the elements necessary for the 
implication of an easement along the Sawmill Canyon Road were 
established. The court's refusal to imply an easement based 
on "traditional notions of finality 1! was in error as a matter 
of law. Edward L. Gillmor's claims are not barred by res 
judicata nor collateral estoppel. 
2. All of the elements necessary to find an 
easement by necessity along the Sawmill Canyon Road were 
established. The court's refusal to allow an easement based 
on "traditional notions of finality" was in error as a matter 
of law. Edward L. Gillmor's claims are not barred by res 
judicata nor collateral estoppel. 
3. The description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in 
the Partition Decree was an error. All of the parties to the 
Partition Action intended that, regardless of how the property 
was divided, full access would be given along the Sawmill 
16
 See Stephen T. Gillmor's testimony at the preliminary 
injunction hearing. (Transcript of preliminary injunction hearing 
Sept. 25, 1987, R. 936, at 116.) 
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Canyon Road, as they had traditionally had. The court erred, 
as a matter of law, in not holding that Edward L. Gillmor's 
claims were properly brought by way of an independent action 
in equity. The court's finding that the lower court did not 
intend to give Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor access 
over Shirley Gillmor's property was clearly erroneous and 
against the weight of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L. 
GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION 
OVER THE ENTIRETY OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD. 
A. The Evidence and the Court's Findings Establish All 
of the Elements for Implication of an Easement Over 
the Entirety of the Sawmill Canyon Road. 
It was undisputed at trial that the description of 
the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree was in error. 
In the present case, the party who made the mistake, Charles 
F. Gillmor, concedes the error and joins in this action 
seeking a modification to remedy the error. The error was 
apparently created by Charles F. Gillmor's expert witness, 
Richard Huffman, who prepared Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in 
the present action) which contained the erroneous description. 
(Tr. Vol. I, at 138-39, 194.) The error left both Edward L. 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor essentially landlocked, unable 
to use nearly all of the property awarded to them. 
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Rights of access were never in dispute in the 
Partition Action. The only issue was what theory of partition 
should be used. Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor 
themselves proposed in the Partition Action that "cross 
easements" should be "awarded to all parties to provide 
traditional means of access to each tract." (Exhibit D-50.) 
Richard Huffman, who originated the erroneous description, 
testified that he sought to divide the parcels so as to be as 
nearly equal as possible. Yet, his description of the Sawmill 
Canyon Road was based on erroneous assumptions. He assumed 
that there was access from the bottom of Thirtyfive Canyon and 
an easement across the Wright property to Thirtyfive Canyon. 
Without an alternate means of access, as assumed by Huffman, 
both Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor are landlocked, 
without the ability to move vehicles and livestock to their 
property for grazing purposes. The trial court specifically 
so found. (Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 884.) 
In his Summary Decision in the present case, the 
trial court stated that the Supreme Court anticipated that 
Edward L. Gillmor's grazing rights would be affected. (R. 
781.) Yet, the trial court in the Partition Action clearly 
intended the parties to have roughly equivalent parcels of 
property, equal in quantity and quality, and that all parties 
be treated fairly with respect to access. The Findings of 
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Fact in the Partition Action described the Sawmill property as 
follows: 
Equal in quantity and quality. 
Division into parcels will not 
decrease value of the whole. 
Can be partitioned without great 
prejudice to owners. 
(Exhibit 33, at 21.) 
The mistaken description of the Sawmill Canyon Road 
left the parties without a semblance of equality. Shirley 
Gillmor has the right to bring vehicles and livestock over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses the property awarded to 
Edward L. Gillmor and to Charles F. Gillmor. They, on the 
other hand, have no similar right. The trial court's finding, 
quoted above, in the Partition Action that the property could 
be "partitioned without great prejudice to owners" is simply 
false unless Edward and Charles are given the right to use the 
Sawmill Canyon Road, as they have traditionally done. 
In his Counterclaim, Edward L. Gillmor stated a 
claim that he is entitled to use the Sawmill Canyon Road where 
it crosses Shirley Gillmor's property as an easement by 
implication. In Ovard v. Cannon , 600 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1979), 
this Court described the elements of an easement by 
implication: 
[A] previous unity of title, followed by 
severance; that at the time of the 
severance the servitude was so plainly 
apparent that any prudent observer should 
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have been aware of it; that the easement 
is reasonably necessary to the use and 
enjoyment of the dominant estate; and it 
must have been continuous, at least in the 
sense that it is used by the possessor 
whenever he desires. 
Id. at 1247 (footnote omitted). See Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 
Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 272 (1947). 
According to this Court in Watkins v. Simonds, 11 
Utah 2d 46, 354 P.2d 852 (1960), 
"[A]n easement created by implication 
arises as an inference of the intention of 
the parties to a conveyance of land. The 
inference is drawn from the circumstances 
under which the conveyance was made rather 
than the language of the conveyance.M 
354 P.2d at 854 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (First) 
of Real Property 476, at 2978). 
The Court in Morris v. Blunt , 49 Utah 243, 161 
P.1127 (1916), similarly stated: 
When an owner of a tract of land has 
arranged and adapted the various parts so 
that one derives a benefit and advantage 
from the other of a continuous and obvious 
character, and he sells one of the parts 
without making mention of the incidental 
advantage or burdens of one in respect to 
the other, there is implied an 
understanding and agreement that such 
advantages and burdens continue as before 
the separation of title. 
161 P. at 1132 (citations omitted).- See Tschaggenv v. Union 
Pacific Land Resources. 555 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1976) ("Where a 
party conveys a portion of land which he owns, he impliedly 
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conveys all those apparent or visible easements over the land 
retained, which at the time of the conveyance are used by the 
grantor for the benefit of the part conveyed and which are 
reasonably necessary for the use thereof") (emphasis added). 
The need for the easement need not be proven as being 
strictly necessary, A finding of reasonable necessity is all 
that must be shown. The court in Cotter v. Moore , 634 S.W.2d 
332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), upheld a judgment awarding an 
easement by implication, noting that the necessity that must be 
shown "is not used in the strictest sense, but means only that 
such use is necessary for the convenient and comfortable 
enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was 
made." Id . at 336• 
In the present case, the evidence demonstrated, and 
the trial court so found, that the use of the Sawmill Canyon 
Road is not only reasonably but also strictly necessary to 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. Without it, there is 
no possible way for them to obtain access to the eastern 
portions of their property for grazing their livestock. 
The fact that the common ownership of the Sawmill 
property was severed by a judicial decree of partition and not 
by a voluntary alienation should make no difference in the 
present case. Courts will imply an easement across a servient 
parcel of property partitioned by judicial decree if the other 
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elements are met. In Deisenroth v. Dodge , 7 111. 2d 340f 131 
N.E.2d 17 (1956), the court affirmed a judgment awarding an 
easement by implication over property that had previously been 
partitioned by judicial decree. The court stated: 
This doctrine of implied easements is not 
limited to cases of direct conveyance by 
deed of the common owner, but applies to 
severance of unity of title by judicial 
proceedings of any character, including 
judgment in partition proceedings, if all 
other essentials are present. 
Id. at 21 (citation omitted; emphasis added). See R. Powell & 
P. Rowen, Powell on Real Property 410, at 34-72, 73 (rev. 
perm. ed. 1987); Mesmer v. Uharriet. 174 Cal. 110, 162 P. 104 
(1916) (court held that property landlocked after decree of 
partition may obtain right of way of necessity). 
The evidence at trial established all of the elements 
necessary for an easement by implication. The Sawmill property 
was originally owned jointly by Edward L. Gillmor, Charles F. 
Gillmor, and Florence Gillmor. That unity of interest was 
partitioned by the decree of the court without making specific 
provision for traditional access to the property awarded to 
Edward and Charles. The lower court erred in failing to hold 
that they have an easement by implication over the entirety of 
the Sawmill Canyon Road. 
B. The Lower Court Erred in Holding that Implication of 
an Easement is Barred by Notions of Finality Inherent 
in the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel. 
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In its Summary Decision, the lower court rested its 
decision on the importance of finality: 
Intervenors suggest that the Judgment and 
Decree of Partition is no impediment to an 
order of this court granting an easement by 
implication or necessity. Such an order, 
however, would violate traditional notions 
of finality inherent in the doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
(R. 784.) 
Traditional notions of finality should not prevent 
the implication of an easement where all the elements have been 
met. Neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel should bar 
implication of an easement in this case. In Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), this Court described the 
elements of res judicata, also known as claim preclusion: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action 
only if the suit in which that cause of 
action is being asserted and the prior suit 
satisfy three requirements. First, both 
cases must involve the same parties or 
their privies. Second, the claim that is 
alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must have 
been one that could and should have been 
raised in the first action. Third, the 
first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. 
Id. at 247 (citations omitted.) See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 
1369, 1374 n.5 (Utah 1988). 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars 
relitigation of an issue actually decided in a previous action 
between the same parties or their privies. Swainston v. 
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Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 766 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 
1988). 
The issue whether an easement should be implied 
following the division of the Sawmill property has never been 
litigated or raised in any action between these parties. 
Implication of an easement was not an issue in the Partition 
Action, nor should it have been raised as an issue. 
Implication of an easement is necessary precisely because the 
parties in the Partition Action mutually erred in failing to 
describe an adequate access over the Sawmill Canyon Road. By 
definition an easement can only be implied after a conveyance 
of real property by common grantors which, in this case, was 
ordered by judicial decree. The issue whether to imply an 
easement could not have arisen during the Partition Action, and 
so should not have been deemed barred by the trial court. 
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is 
similarly unavailing as a bar to implication of an easement. 
That issue was never raised nor litigated in the Partition 
Action. It has never been raised between these parties until 
the present action. 
To be sure, the trial court did not specifically rest 
its ruling on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
estoppel, but, rather, focused on "notions of finality" 
inherent in those doctrines. (R. 784.) The court appears to 
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have perceived an additional penumbral doctrine behind the 
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, under which, 
in the trial court's view, a final decree may not be disturbed, 
even if it is to correct an undisputed error. Aware of the 
history of litigation between these parties, the lower court 
also seemed concerned about fostering further actions between 
them.17 
The trial court's apprehensions are simply unfounded. 
Implication of an easement under these circumstances will not 
open the floodgates to new litigation over the Partition 
Decree. It will allow both Charles and Edward Gillmor, who 
were adversaries in the Partition Action, to have the access 
that was intended for them in that case; it will correct an 
error that has denied them the use of most of their property; 
and it will demonstrate the importance of the rule of law by 
recognizing the validity of this Court's prior opinions 
regarding the implication of easements. If all of the elements 
have been met, as they have in this case, then an easement 
should be implied, regardless of the risks of spawning future 
litigation. 
17
 The court stated: "Courts should not provide inspiration 
to these parties to continue litigating the partition case ad 
infinitum." (R. 784.) 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L. 
GILLMOR IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY NECESSITY 
OVER THE ENTIRETY OF THE SAWMILL CANYON ROAD. 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor also claim 
the right to use the Sawmill Canyon Road on the theory that it 
constitutes a way of necessity. A way or easement by necessity 
shares some of the elements of an easement by implication 
except that it need not be shown that at the time of the 
severance the servitude created by the easement was apparent, 
obvious, and visible. Nor need it be shown that it was 
continuous or self-acting. In Tschaaaenv v. Union Pacific Land 
Resources, Corp., 555 P.2d 277 (Utah 1976), this Court stated: 
[A] way of necessity arises when there is a 
conveyance of a part of a tract of land 
which is so situated that either the part 
conveyed or the part retained is surrounded 
with no access to a road to the outer 
world. In either case, there is an implied 
grant or reservation of a way across the 
part not so surrounded unless it clearly 
appears that the parties to the conveyance 
did not intend such an easement. However, 
it is not necessary that the easement be 
visible, apparent, or obvious. 
Id. at 281. 
The Court in Tschaaaenv also noted that it need not 
be shown that the easement was continuous and self-acting. Id. 
at 280. See Savage v. Nielsen, 114 Utah 22, 197 P.2d 117 
(1948) (Court stated that if a common grantor conveys a tract 
that is landlocked without mentioning a means of ingress and 
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egress "it is presumed that he intended to create a servient 
estate in himself to the extent of a right-of-way in favor of 
the other tract of land"); Hewitt v. Meanev, 181 Cal. App. 3d 
367, 226 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1986) ("The law under certain 
circumstances recognizes an implied easement or way of 
necessity to landlocked parcels of realty based on public 
policy favoring their use and development"); R. Howell and P. 
Rowen, Powell on Real Property 410, at 34-67, 68 (rev. perm, 
ed. 1987). 
The present case is similar to Wagner v. Fairlamb, 
151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165 (1963). There, the court upheld 
the finding of a way of necessity across a tract of property 
that formerly belonged to a common grantor. The court noted 
that there are three requirements for a way of necessity: (1) 
original ownership of the entire tract by a single grantor 
prior to the division thereof; (2) the existence of a necessity 
at the time of the severance; and (3) that the necessity for 
the particular right-of-way be great. .Id. at 168. The court 
noted that, according to the evidence, the area in question was 
"a very mountainous, rocky area with steep canyon walls, where 
roads at best are hazardous, expensive and dangerous to build." 
Id . The court observed further that the road in question "is 
under all the circumstances the only practical method of 
affording ingress and egress for the purpose of mining or 
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otherwise using the south half of the Bradley." Id. 
Similarly, in Beck v. Mills, 616 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1981), the court upheld the finding of an easement by 
implication based, in part, on the evidence that "a mountain 
range made another approach highly impractical, and that at the 
time of the partition there was no roadway across these 
mountains." Ixi. at 354. 
The parallel between Wagner and Beck and the present 
case is clear. Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor simply 
have no other way than the Sawmill Canyon Road by which to move 
sheep and cattle to the eastern portion of their property 
because of the mountainous and rugged terrain. The Sawmill 
Canyon is burdened on each side by steep cliffs over which 
livestock are unable to pass. Without the right to use the 
road, that portion of their property will be useless to Edward 
L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. 
The facts in the present case justify a finding of 
way of necessity. There was unity of ownership, the right of 
way has always been necessary to access the landlocked parcel, 
and the right of way is necessary even under the strictest 
standard of necessity. This Court should hold that the trial 
court erred in not so holding. As argued above, the lower 
court's reliance on "notions of finality" should not bar the 
claims at issue here. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EDWARD L. 
GILLMOR WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REFORMING 
OR CORRECTING THE DESCRIPTION OF THE SAWMILL 
CANYON ROAD IN THE PARTITION DECREE ON 
THE GROUNDS OF MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
A. The Description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the 
Partition Decree was a Mutual Mistake and the Court 
Should Have Modified the Description Pursuant to the 
Independent Action in Equity Brought by Edward L. 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. 
In his Counterclaim, Edward L. Gillmor alleged that 
the erroneous description of the Sawmill Canyon Road contained 
in the Partition Decree was the result of a mutual mistake of 
fact on the part of the parties and the trial court in the 
Partition Action. The Counterclaim stated a claim to modify 
the Partition Decree by way of an independent action, as 
provided under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. That 
rule allows a court to entertain "an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set 
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court." On this basis, 
Edward L. Gillmor sought an order of the court in the present 
action reforming or correcting the description so as to 
describe the Sawmill Canyon Road in its entirety, including the 
portion of the road running from plaintiff's property through 
the easterly portions of the Sawmill property belonging to 
Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. 
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The trial court held that the Partition Decree cannot 
be modified under the provisions of Rule 60(b) to correct the 
mistake. To do so would undermine the finality of a judgment. 
(R. 885.) The court erred in so holding. This Court has 
previously recognized that a mistake of fact or false 
assumption may provide relief to a party under Rule 60(b)(7) or 
pursuant to an independent action, regardless of the amount of 
time that has passed. In Eaan v. Eqan, 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 
1977), the Court considered an independent action in equity by 
the plaintiff seeking relief from a divorce decree that 
determined that he was the father of the defendant's child. 
The Court held that the relief from the judgment could well 
have been justified on the grounds of fraud. The Court stated 
further that 
mistake of fact may be grounds under an 
action in equity to grant relief as 
provided under Rule 60(b)(7) it states 
[sic] "any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of a judgment." 
Further, the Supreme Court of this state 
has ruled erroneous assumptions may be 
grounds for entering a new order. 
Id. at 705-06 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). See Stewart 
v. Sullivan, 29, Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74, 76 ("The provisions 
of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently broad to permit the court to 
set aside its former order which appeared to have been entered 
upon an erroneous assumption and to enter a new order based 
upon the record before it"); Nev v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 
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299 P.2d 1114, 1116 (1956) (Court held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to relief from a judgment under Rule 60(b)(7) on 
mistaken belief that her husband was responsible for debt owed 
to plaintiff under terms of divorce decree). 
The equitable power of a court to correct or modify a 
judgment is available where, as in the present case, the 
judgment contains an inaccurate property description. In the 
case of West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber, 
213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954), the court had before it an appeal 
from the dismissal of an independent action in equity filed by 
the plaintiff under Federal Rule 60(b)18 seeking correction of 
an error in a property description contained in a judgment in 
an earlier case between the parties! Noting that the prior 
judgment had been entered approximately six or seven years 
prior to the commencement of the independent action, the 
opinion observed that "the desire of courts to repair an 
injustice wrought by a judgment will overcome the necessity for 
finality where it is against conscience to execute that 
judgment and where that judgment was rendered without fault or 
neglect on the part of the party seeking to reform it." Ld. at 
18
 Because Federal Rule 60(b) is identical in pertinent part 
to Utah Rule 60(b) Federal court opinions are helpful in 
interpreting the Utah rule. This Court observed in Winegar v. Slim 
Olsen, 122 Utah 487, 252 P. 2d 205 (1953), that since the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal Rules, "it is 
proper that we examine decisions under the federal rules to 
determine the meaning thereof." Id . at 207. 
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704. The court reversed the dismissal, and held that the 
reformation of a mistake in the judgment was the proper subject 
of an independent action. The court stated further: 
The independent suit in equity, as a remedy 
for relief from mistake, however, has been 
shrouded with the same lore and mystery as 
the ancillary writs. Fortunately, in 1935 
the Supreme Court decided the case of State 
of Wisconsin v. State of Michigan, 295 U.S. 
455, 55 S.Ct. 786, 79 L.Ed. 1541, wherein a 
former judgment based on mutual mistake of 
the parties was corrected in a subsequent 
independent proceeding. There, as here, 
the parties consented to a decree dividing 
certain land between them. It developed 
that through mutual mistake of the parties 
the decree agreed upon and signed by the 
court was in error in that the dividing 
line therein contained was not a dividing 
line actually intended by the parties. The 
Supreme Court, without discussing the 
principles involved and simply citing the 
case of Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U.S. 391, 
397, 399, 24 L.Ed. 481, decided that the 
court had jurisdiction to correct the 
decree. Since Thompson v. Maxwell was a 
suit between private litigants to reform a 
judgment relating to land, it can be safely 
assumed that the Supreme Court's decision 
in State of Wisconsin v. State of Michigan 
should not be limited to cases of original 
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. 
In an excellent article entitled, 
"Federal Relief from Final Judgment," 
published in 55 Yale Law Journal 623, 655-
659, Professor Moore and his associate 
carefully analyzed the Supreme Court's 
decisions on this subject and conclude, as 
this court does, that a federal court, in 
an independent action, has jurisdiction to 
modify a final judgment in a former 
proceeding on the ground of mistake as well 
as fraud, at least where mutual mistake is 
shown and where the party seeking relief is 
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without fault or negligence in the 
premises. 
Id. at 706 (emphasis added)-19 See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure 2868, at 239-40 (1973) (an 
independent action for relief from a judgment will lie on the 
basis of accident or of mistake.) 
An independent action for relief from a judgment need 
not be filed in the same court rendering the judgment. 11 C. 
Wright & A. Miller, supra 2868, at 242-43 & n.24; Locklin v. 
Switzer Brothers, Inc., 335 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1964), 
cert, denied, 379 U.S. 962 (1965) ("The independent equitable 
action may be maintained in any court exercising equitable 
jurisdiction"); Carr v. District of Colombia, 543 F.2d 917, 927 
N.83 (1976) ("Independent actions left open by Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b) are not confined to the court that rendered the judgment 
attacked, but may be brought in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction"). The present case is filed in the same court, 
although in a different county. 
In ordering the dismissal of Edward L. Gillmor's 
Counterclaim, the trial court apparently held that the "catch-
all" provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) could not be invoked to grant 
19
 The Breece Lumber opinion goes on to state that "[t]he 
conclusion of Professor Moore in this regard is apparently adopted 
by the Advisory Committee of Federal Rules for, in its note to the 
1946 amendment of Rule 60, Professor Moore's article and the pages 
thereof specifically relating to this subject are cited with 
approval." 213 F.2d at 706 (citation omitted). 
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relief from a judgment on grounds of mutual mistake. (Finding 
of Fact No. 31, R. 885.) In so holding the trial court 
overlooked the fact that Edward L. Gillmor's claims were 
brought by way of an independent claim in equity, which is 
specifically authorized by Rule 60(b), and for which there is 
no statute of limitation.20 It is an equitable claim which 
the trial court, sitting in equity, had jurisdiction to 
consider on the merits. The trial court erred in refusing to 
remedy the obvious mistake made by the parties and the court in 
the Partition Action. 
At the trial of the Partition Action the parties 
specifically agreed that errors in the legal descriptions of 
rights of way could be corrected thereafter if necessary. 
During the trial of that case, Charles F. Gillmor submitted 
Exhibit 113-D (Exhibit D-46 in the present case), with the 
20
 Although motions to set aside a judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1) through (4) are subject to a three month statute of 
limitation, there is no time limit on when an independent action 
may be brought. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice & Procedure 2868, at 241; In re Casco Chemical 
Company , 335 F.2d 645, 652 (5th Cir. 1964) ("We have clearly held 
that when the 60(b) relief is sought by an independent action, 
there is no time limit save laches on when the action may be 
brought"); Crosby v. Mills , 413 F.2d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1969) 
(Rule 60(b) "permits an independent action and prescribes no time 
limitations for such action"); West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. Inc. v. 
George E. Breece Lumber Co., Inc., 213 F.2d 702, 706-07 (5th Cir. 
1954) (court held that independent action was proper to correct 
error in property description in nine year old judgment); Carr v. 
District of Columbia, 543 F.2d 917, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (court 
held that only method of litigating a claim that is time-barred 
under Rule 60(b) is by independent action). 
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stipulation of the parties that descriptions could be modified. 
When he offered the exhibit in the Partition Action, counsel 
for Charles F. Gillmor stated: 
And the proposed stipulation is that 
if Mr. Huffman were to testify, that he 
would testify that he prepared those 
descriptions using existing roads wherever 
possible; that they are the best 
descriptions he can make without an on-the-
ground survey; and we would submit that 
thev could be modified by survey and bv 
further order of the court should they 
prove unreasonable. And I would therefore 
tender that testimony to the court as if he 
were called. 
(Exhibit D-47.) 
This was consistent with the "Motion" filed by 
Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor during the Partition 
Action requesting that the court "view the easements as items 
of continuing jurisdiction." (Exhibit D-50.) This Court 
should hold that Shirley Gillmor, as Florence's successor in 
interest, is now estopped from taking a contrary position. 
Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 491, 495-96 (Utah 1980); Blonauist 
v. Frandsen. 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah 1984). 
B. The Trial Court's Finding that the Court in the 
Partition Action did not Intend to Provide Edward L. 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor Access over the 
Property Awarded to Florence Gillmor was Clearly 
Erroneous and Against the Weight of the Evidence. 
The trial court in the present case found that the 
trial court in the Partition Action "did not intend to provide 
Edward Gillmor and Charles Gillmor access over parcels awarded 
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to Florence Gillmor." (Finding of Fact No. 28, R. 884.) This 
finding is in error and is unsupported by any evidence. The 
only intent of the trial court in the Partition Action was to 
accommodate the stipulation of the parties with respect to 
easements. The issue of rights-of-way was not the subject of 
dispute on which the trial court in that case was required to 
find facts. The court merely adopted the proposed easement 
set forth in Exhibit 113-D which, as shown above, contained an 
erroneous description. There is no evidence that the trial 
court intended to deny both Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. 
Gillmor (whose expert prepared the description in Exhibit 113-D 
and whose lawyer introduced the exhibit) traditional vehicular 
and livestock access to their property. There is no evidence 
that the trial court intended a result that left both of them 
essentially landlocked. Such an intent would have clearly 
contradicted the court's specific finding that the Sawmill 
property could be partitioned "without great prejudice" to the 
owners. (R. 33, at 21.) 
The only evidence of the parties' intent is that 
Edward, Charles, and Florence all agreed that, regardless of 
how the Sawmill property was divided, each would have 
traditional access to the property awarded to him or her. 
During the trip over the Sawmill Canyon Road in 1976, the 
parties agreed that the road provided the only access to the 
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property, (Tr. Vol. I, at 59-60, 130-32, 143-45, 148, 162.) 
There is no evidence that Florence had a contrary intent. 
Rather, as indicated by her "Petition Relating to Procedure to 
be Followed in Partitioning Land," Florence intended that 
"cross easements" should be "awarded all parties to provide 
traditional means of access to each tract." (Exhibit D-50.) 
Moreover, in their "Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights," 
Florence and Charles proposed that the Sawmill property be 
accessed along the Sawmill Canyon Road. The easement described 
in D-50 follows the road across the top of the property awarded 
to Florence and proceeds south onto the property awarded to 
Edward. (Exhibit D-44; Tr. Vol. I, at 70-71, 132.) 
Additional evidence of the trial court's intent in 
the Partition Action is found in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (Exhibit 33, at 21),21 where the stock 
trails for the Sawmill property were described as follows: 
Across Wright property to get to grazing 
land, Thirty Five Canyon. See access. 
The description under "Access" read as follows: 
On existing road from 1-15 frontage road 
across Wright property in mouth of Sawmill 
Canyon. 
21
 Exhibit 31 was also introduced at trial as page 21 from 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the 
Partition Action, which dealt specifically with the Sawmill 
Property. 
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Taken together, these descriptions describe the Sawmill Canyon 
Road from the point where it leaves highway 1-15, crosses the 
Wright property, and proceeds across the property awarded to 
Florence to terminate at the northern end of Thirtyfive Canyon. 
(Tr. Vol. I, at 65-69.) 
Significantly, the evidence at the trial of the 
present action also showed that Richard Huffman, hired as an 
expert by both Florence and Charles, was responsible for the 
erroneous description of the Sawmill Canyon Road. He testified 
that, in preparing the legal description of the easement 
adopted by the court in the Findings of Fact he assumed that 
access was available across the Wright's property to the south 
end of Thirtyfive Canyon. (Tr. Vol. I, at 212, 218-21.) The 
evidence showed, however, that these assumptions were in error. 
There is no access across the Wright's property to the mouth of 
Thirtyfive Canyon. (Tr. Vol. II, at 61.) Even if there were, 
however, Thirtyfive Canyon would not provide suitable grazing 
access because it is too steep. (Finding of Fact No. 26, R. 
884; Tr. Vol. I, at 37-38.) 
The evidence thus demonstrated that the denial of 
access over the Sawmill Canyon Road was the result of a mutual 
mistake, unintended by the trial court in the Partition Action. 
The lower court erred in refusing to exercise its equitable 
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powers to remedy the mistake by reforming the description of 
the easement in the Partition Decree, 
The Partition Action was a complex case lasting over 
a period of nearly ten years involving approximately 34,000 
acres of ranch property. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (Exhibit 33) is 75 pages in length and the Partition 
Decree (Exhibit 2) is 41 pages, primarily consisting of legal 
descriptions for the real property and rights of way being 
apportioned between the parties. It was not until the hearing 
on the preliminary injunction held before Judge Wilkinson in 
the present case on September 25, 1987, that Edward L. Gillmor 
learned that Stephen T. Gillmor intended to deny him access 
over the Sawmill Canyon Road to the eastern portion of the 
Sawmill property. On learning of the problem, Edward sought 
legal assistance. (Tr. Vol. I, at 65.) 
As additional evidence of the trial court's intent in 
the Partition Action, that court specifically found that the 
Sawmill property could be partitioned "without great prejudice" 
to the owners. (Exhibit 33, at 21.) Otherwise, the court 
would have ordered a sale of the Sawmill Property, as required 
by Section 78-39-1. Without access to the eastern portion of 
the Sawmill Property, both Edward and Charles have suffered a 
great prejudice, in that a major part of the Sawmill property 
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awarded to them is essentially useless for grazing 
livestock.22 
The Partition Decree contemplated an equal division 
of all properties, with equal access. Without access to the 
eastern portion of the Sawmill Property for grazing purposes, 
the Sawmill Property would have been unfairly divided. 
Florence Gillmor was given one-half of the Sawmill property 
with full access and grazing rights. Fairness and equity 
require that Edward L. Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor be given 
the same right with respect to their property. This Court has 
the equitable power to correct the injustice to these parties 
by allowing them proper access to their property, as Shirley 
Gillmor has access to hers. 
22
 The trial court in the Partition Action found, in 
Paragraph 13 of the Findings of Fact, that "[a]ll the parties 
desire to utilize some portions of the partitioned properties in 
future ranching operations, whether 'they conduct such operations 
themselves or lease some of the properties to other ranchers." 
(Exhibit 33, at 6.) Thus, the court in that case found that the 
highest and best use of the Sawmill property "grazing and 
recreational." (Exhibit 33, at 21.) The court was aware that 
Edward L. Gillmor's primary desire in the Partition Action was to 
continue his ranching and livestock operations. Hence his desire, 
according to the Supreme Court, that the grazing land not be 
partitioned into "small unusable pieces." 657 P.2d at 741. It was 
clearly contemplated that Edward L. Gillmor intended to utilize all 
of the properties awarded to him for ranching, including the 
Sawmill property. Having access to the eastern portion of the 
Sawmill property awarded to him was essential to Edward as it was 
to Charles. The sole access available to them was and is over the 
Sawmill Canyon Road. 
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Accordingly, Edward L. Gillmor urges this Court to 
reverse the trial court and to order that the description of 
the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree be reformed and 
corrected to describe the road in its entirety, thus giving 
Edward L, Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor the right to use the 
road to gain access to the eastern portions of their property. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to award Edward L. 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor an easement by implication or by 
necessity over the Sawmill Canyon Road where it crosses the 
property awarded to Florence Gillmor in the Partition Action. 
All of the elements for such easements were met. The trial 
court specifically found that "Edward Gillmor and Charles 
Gillmor do not have traditional grazing access to eastern 
portions of their Sawmill parcels unless they are allowed 
access over parcels awarded to Florence Gillmor and now owned 
by Shirley Gillmor." (R. 883-84.) The lower court's holding 
that the relief sought is barred by "traditional notions of 
finality" (R. 885) is in error as a matter of law. The claims 
for an easement by implication or by necessity are not barred 
by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
The lower court also erred in refusing to reform the 
description of the Sawmill Canyon Road in the Partition Decree. 
The evidence established that the error in the description was 
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caused by mutual mistake. As a court in equity, the lower 
court should have made the requested modification. The court's 
finding that the trial court in the Partition Action intended 
to deprive Edward and Charles Gillmor of traditional access to 
the property awarded to them was against the clear weight of 
the evidence and was clearly erroneous. 
ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(f), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Cross-Appellant Edward L. Gillmor has appended to 
this Brief copies of the following documents: 
A. Illustrative map of the Sawmill Canyon Property, 
showing boundaries and roads that were the subject of the 
evidence introduced at the trial, as partially indicated on 
Exhibit 30. 
B. Pertinent portions of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in the Partition Action. (Exhibit 33.) 
C. Pertinent portions of the Partition Decree. 
(Exhibit 2.) 
D. Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights, filed 
in the Partition Action by Florence Gillmor and Charles F. 
Gillmor. (Exhibit D-44.) 
E. Procedure Relating to Procedure to be Followed 
in Partitioning Land, filed in the Partition Action by Florence 
Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. (Exhibit D-50.) 
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F. Motion, filed in the Partition Action by 
Florence Gillmor and Charles F. Gillmor. (Exhibit D-51.) 
DATED this . > day of September, 1990. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Richard C. Skeen 
R. Stephen Marshall 
By ^ jCc/^^y *•' V^^ tw^. 
i 
Attorneys for Cross-
Appellant/Intervenor-Defendant 
Edward L. Gillmor 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing Brief of Cross-
Appellant/ Intervenor-Defendant Edward Leslie Gillmor to be hand 
delivered this ^ ;__ day of September, 1990, to the following: 
James B. Lee 
John B. Wilson 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Gilbert Athay 
72 East 400 South 
Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
p^ y^ /l— N A / ^ 
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Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence Gillmor 
79 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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of and for 
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Attorneys for Defendants Charles 
F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and SIV ) 
GILLMOR, his wife, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiffs, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. ) Civil No. 223998 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES F. ) 
GILLMOR and MELBA G. GILLMOR, ) 
his wife, ) 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
further trial proceedings following a remand from the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, before the above-
entitled court sitting without a jury, Peter F. Leary, 
Judge, presiding, commencing on the 11th day of February, 
1980, and concluding on the 4th day of March, 1980. All 
parties were present and represented by counsel, plaintiffs 
Edward Leslie Gillmor and Siv Gillmor being represented by 
E. J. Skeen and Clifford L. Ashton, defendant Florence 
Gillmor being represented by James B. Lee, and defendant 
Charles F. Gillmor being represented by Harold G. Christensen 
and H. James Clegg. 
These final trial proceedings were conducted for 
the purposes of allowing plaintiffs to present evidence with 
respect to appurtenant rights in accordance with plaintiffs' 
theory of partition and value, to allow plaintiffs to present 
their evidence with respect to the equities involved in 
abolishing plaintiffs' livestock business, and to receive 
evidence offered by plaintiff Edward Leslie Gillmor pertaining 
to his theory of partition that the properties be partitioned 
based upon highest and best use and value, and that he be 
awarded such properties as would permit him to carry on his 
ranching operation. 
The Court received evidence throughout the trial 
from all parties in support of their respective proposals 
for partition of these common properties. The Court has 
considered, among other evidence, testimony regarding 
historical use of the property by the Gillmor family, its 
present use, its quantity, its description, the quality, 
forage, and carrying capacity based upon animal units, 
water, water rights, stock in irrigation companies, livestock 
trails, crops, improvements, access, easements and cross-
easements, impact of flood plain and zoning, regulations, 
highest and best use, market value, market value based on 
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forage and carrying capacity, leases, BLM permits, transfer 
of BLM permits, commensurate land, the number and kind of 
livestock operated by plaintiffs (or a corporation they 
control), the value of that livestock, the economics of 
plaintiffs' operation of the livestock business, the equities 
involved in abolishing plaintiffs' livestock business, and 
the equities of all the parties. 
The Court having considered all the evidence, 
arguments, and briefs submitted by the parties both at 
earlier trial proceedings and at these final trial pro-
ceedings, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby 
makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties are tenants in common of land 
located in Salt Lake, Summit and Tooele Counties, State of 
Utah, comprising a total of approximately 33,000 acres. 
2. Plaintiff Edward Leslie Gillmor (hereinafter 
"plaintiff") owns an undivided one-fourth interest in all 
the properties to be partitioned except the Whitehead 
property, in which he owns an undivided one-half interest. 
3. Defendant Florence Gillmor owns an undivided 
one-half interest in all the properties to be partitioned 
except the Whitehead property, in which she has no interest. 
4. Defendant Charles F. Gillmor owns an undivided 
one-fourth interest in all the subject properties except 
the Whitehead property, in which he owns an undivided one-
half interest. 
5. The plaintiff has proposed a division of the 
properties which would award him the following parcels 
(hereinafter designated by the traditional names of each 
property, which names were used by the parties and witnesses 
throughout the trial): 
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Salt Lake County Acres 
Salt Pond 590 
West Grazing 1,968 
Duck Club 1,050 
Old Ranch Properties (including 1,619 
§31 and property west of sewer 
ditch) 
Summit County 
Six East 9,224 
Tooele County 
Rush Valley 6,600 
I 
TOTAL 21,051 
6. This proposal, if accepted, would result in 
plaintiff receiving 63.8 percent of the land for his one-
' fourth interest in the property. Plaintiff seeks to be 
| awarded 100 percent of the Tooele property, 72.3 percent of 
; the Salt Lake property, and 48.17 percent of the Summit 
i 
County property. 
I 7. The defendants have proposed a division of 
| each of the various properties, with the exception of the 
parcel known as the Old Ranch property, into parcels which 
are equal in quantity and quality, thereby allowing each 
party the opportunity to benefit from changes in the value 
of each parcel as it changes from one type of use to another. 
Fifteen of those parcels are more particularly identified 
in defendants' three petitions for partition, dated June 
22, 1976, November 12, 1976, and March 23, 1977, which 
descriptions as amended are incorporated herein by reference. 
The parties were permitted to state preferences between 
parcels and defendants testified that each was willing to 
abide the division, despite preferences. If defendants' 
!
 proposal is accepted, plaintiff and defendant Charles F. 
1
 Gillmor would each be awarded one-fourth of the total 
acreage of the subject property and Florence Gillmor would 
receive one-half of the total, except as to the Whitehead 
property in which Charles F. Gillmor and plaintiff would 
each be awarded one-half. Under defendants' proposal, each 
co-owner would receive his pro rata share of all properties 
of similar quality and in each physically separate location. 
8. In making its decision on partition the 
Court gave full consideration to the preferences expressed 
by all the parties during the trial and their reasons for 
those preferences regarding each parcel of land. 
9. With the exception of the Whitehead property, 
each of the owners of property in this action acquired his 
or her interest through inheritance. Plaintiff and defendant 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., inherited from their father, 
Charles Frank Gillmor, Sr. Defendant Florence Gillmor 
inherited from her father, Edward Lincoln Gillmor. 
10. Historically, the land has been used by the 
Gillmor family for a seasonal migratory livestock operation. 
11. Various members of the Gillmor family have 
improved the properties by developing wells, water holes, 
erecting fences, grading roads, building corrals, sheds and 
cabins, developing a base ranch, and developing and culti-
vating land for agricultural use. 
12. Commencing in 1953, the plaintiff, in a 
partnership with the defendant Charles F. Gillmor, operated 
the livestock business by virtue of leases from Edward 
Lincoln Gillmor. In 1957, the plaintiff, defendant Charles 
F. Gillmor, and Stephen T. Gillmor operated the livestock 
business and this partnership leased the land owned by Edward 
Lincoln Gillmor. Following the retirement from the family 
business of Charles Frank Gillmor, Jr., in 1968, plaintiff 
and Stephen T. Gillmor leased land from Charles F. Gillmor, 
Jr. and Edward Lincoln Gillmor. After 1970, the plaintiff's 
partnership with Stephen T. Gillmor ceased. 
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13. All the parties desire to utilize some 
portions of the partitioned properties in future ranching 
operations, whether they conduct such operations themselves 
lor lease some of the properties to other ranchers. 
14. It is a common practice in this state for 
ranchers to lease from others, including state and federal 
governments, some or all of the properties on which they 
conduct their livestock operations and to lease such properties 
.to other ranchers. Also, this has historically been the 
practice for the subject properties. 
15. In early 1969 plaintiff and Stephen T. 
Gillmor, who were then partners, entered into a lease with 
I Edward Lincoln Gillmor of his one-half interest in the 
properties. The agreed rent for the Tooele County property 
was $0.15 per acre, for the Summit County property was 
$0.50 per acre, and for the Salt Lake County property was 
I$0.65 per acre. Stephen T. Gillmor subsequently assigned 
|his interest in the leases to plaintiff. Those leases 
(terminated December 31, 1978. 
16. In late 1969 plaintiff and Stephen T. Gillmor 
also entered into leases with defendant Charles Frank 
Gillmor, Jr., of his one-fourth interest in the properties, 
for the same rent per acre as those in plaintiff's lease 
with Edward Lincoln Gillmor. Stephen T. Gillmor also 
subsequently assigned his interest in those leases to 
plaintiff. Those leases will terminate this year (1980). 
In 1969, when plaintiff entered the foregoing leases in 
conjunction with his livestock partnership with Stephen 
Gillmor, plaintiff did not lease his one-fourth interest in 
the land to that partnership. 
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'i 17. Plaintiff was able to utilize all the common 
• Gillmor properties for his livestock business from 1969 to 
! December 31, 1978 because of his leases with Florence Gillmor 
and C. Frank Gillmor, Jr. 
I 18. Plaintiff paid substantially lower rates for 
leasing the Gillmor common properties than the rates charged 
1 by other grazing land lessors in this state in the late 
' 1970's. 
19. Plaintiff testified that partitioning the 
I subject properties in kind according to the proposal advanced 
I by the defendants will force him out of the livestock 
II business. However, plaintiff has not leased or attempted 
I to lease lands to replace the lands he formerly leased from 
11 defendant Florence Gillmor's father or the lands which he 
now has on lease from Charles F. Gillmor and which will 
I soon expire. Evidence was presented that such lease lands 
i | 
|l are available, and evidence was presented as to the cost 
i ' 
thereof. 
II 
11 20. Plaintiff also testified at trial that even 
i 
i 
I if he were awarded partition in kind pursuant to his 
II proposal, he would not be able to conduct a year-round 
I livestock operation on the subject properties because he 
II does not seek to be awarded any Summit County properties 
other than Six East although he needs such properties for 
I spring and fall grazing from late May to early July and 
from early October through mid-November each year. 
Accordingly, even if plaintiff is awarded all the properties 
i he has requested, the acreage he would receive would not be 
' sufficient to support a livestock operation of the size he 
now owns (approximately 950 animal units) each spring and 
l! 
!' fall. Similarly, he will be without sufficient forage for 
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other seasons to the extent he does not seek the 700 North 
and Sawmill properties, which he currently uses to capacity. 
21. Pursuant to an order made December 30, 1976, 
the subject property except Whitehead was segregated into 
separate blocks, with each of said blocks (except the Old 
Ranch property) divided into parcels or sub-blocks of 
equal acreage. The blocks are denominated as follows: 
Salt Lake County: 
1. Canning 
2. 700 North 
3. Duck Club 
4. West Grazing 
5. Salt Pond 
6. Section 31 
7. West of sewage canal 
8. Old Ranch property 
a. Old ranch (corrals and buildings) 
b. Irrigated farm 
c. Sub-irrigated east of sewage canal 
9. Amos (2 blocks) 
10. 1700 North 
11. 2450 West 
12. Emigration Canyon (3 blocks) 
Whitehead (owned by Charles F. 
Gillmor and Edward Leslie Gillmor) 
Summit County 
13. Seven East 
14. Six East 
15. Sawmill 
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I 
I 
16. Park City properties (5 blocks 
(as shown below): 
a. Todd Hollow (Porter lease) 
b. Pace Meadow 
c. 90 Acres 
d. Quarry 
e. Clark ranch 
Tooele County 
17. Rush Valley 
22. In recent years the following properties 
were used by plaintiff generally as follows: 
Tooele County; 
Rush Valley - winter range for sheep 
Salt Lake County: 
Salt Pond - spring range for sheep and 
cattle; fall range for cattle. 
Duck Club - spring range for sheep and 
cattle; fall range for cattle. 
700 North - spring for lambing of sheep 
and calving of cows. Thirty acres for hay 
and grain. 
1700 North - growing hay and residual 
pasture. 
Ranch property: 
Section 31 - spring range for 
sheep and cattle; fall range for 
cattle. 
West of canal - spring range 
for sheep and cattle; fall range 
for cattle. 
Old Ranch - corrals, buildings, 
headquarters of livestock operations 
and farming. 
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Improved - farming 
Sub-Irrigated East of Canal -
hay. 
Whitehead - spring range for 
sheep and cattle; fall range for 
cattle. 
Summit County; 
All Park City properties - spring and 
fall ranges for sheep. Summer range for 
rams and some cattle. Growing hay. 
Six East - summer range for sheep and 
cattle. 
Sawmill - summer range for cattle. 
23. The following appraisers testified on behalf 
of plaintiff as to the market value of some or all of the 
subject properties: Edward P. Westra, Richard M. Patterson 
and Wilbur Harding. The following appraisers testified on 
behalf of defendants as to the market value of the properties: 
Richard T. Huffman and Blaine D. Hales. 
24. Those appraisers presented the following 
testimony as to the total value of the subject properties: 
Appraiser: Fair Market Value: 
Westra $43,615,150 
Hale $37,157,600 
Huffman $35,542,200 
25. The average net income of plaintiff's livestock 
business for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978 amounted to 
$12,497.53 per year, including oil lease income to plaintiff 
of $104,000 received over two of those years. 
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26. The plaintiff's livestock business paid him 
no salary in 1976, 1977, and 1978. Had plaintiff's live-
stock corporation paid him a salary and had it been required 
to pay current fair market value for the leases under which 
plaintiff operated his business, that average net income 
would have been considerably less than $12,497.53 each 
year, even though he was employed full time in the ranching 
operation. 
27. Plaintiff's livestock business netted him a 
0.028 percent rate of return on the fair market value of 
those properties (without including investment in livestock 
and equipment) according to the testimony of his appraiser, 
Mr. Westra; a 0.0336 percent rate of return on fair market , 
value according to defendants' appraiser, Mr. Hale; or a 
0.035 percent rate of return on fair market value according 
to defendants' expert, Mr. Huffman. 
28. A reasonable return on investment has not 
been obtained by the plaintiff in the operation of his 
livestock business. 
29. If plaintiff were awarded the land which he 
has requested, he would receive an award having 16 percent 
of the total market value of the property, according to the 
appraisal rendered by Edward P. Westra. This would include 
63.8 percent of the land. He would receive 26 percent of 
the market value of the subject properties for his one-
fourth interest according to Blaine D. Hales. He would 
receive 26 percent of the market value of the subject 
properties for his one-fourth interest according to Richard 
T. Huffman. 
30. It is inequitable to award to plaintiff, as 
the owner of a one-fourth interest in each parcel of land, 
63.8 percent of the land. It is equitable to partition 
each parcel of land so that each owner is awarded part of 
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each parcel in accordance with his interest therein, and so 
that each owner will be able to benefit from varying increases 
in the value of each parcel as their uses shift from present 
use to higher and better use. 
31. Except for the Old Ranch, each of the remaining 
blocks of land is dissimilar to other blocks in material 
respects such as altitude, vegetation, present use and 
potential use, water availability and development and 
proximity to populated areas, but each such block is, 
within itself, consistent throughout in such material 
respects that each party can obtain his fair share of each 
property, quality and quantity considered, if those properties 
are so partitioned in kind that each party receives his pro 
rata share of acreage in each block. 
31. With respect to each block of property, the 
Court finds the following facts: 
a. Salt Lake County; 
Canning 
Acres: 160 more or less. 
Division: Each 40 acres 
more or less. Equal in 
quantity and quality. Divi-
sion into parcels will not 
decrease value of the whole. 
Can be partitioned without 
prejudice to the owners. 
Present Use: None 
Highest and Best Use: Industrial 
Improvements: 5600 West Street 
and roads built by state 
Stock trails: None 
Water: A small well on parcel 
3. Water users claim nos. 
3695, 3774 and 3775. 
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Access: Oil field road 
from South Fork of Chalk Creek 
and White's Basin, Perdue, 
Neil and Spring Canyon, Lodgepole 
routes described in "stock 
trails," supra. 
Sawmill 
Acres: 5139 more or less 
Division: Each 1284.75 
acres more or less. Equal in 
quantity and quality. Division 
into parcels will not decrease 
value of the whole. Can be 
partitioned without great 
prejudice to owners. 
Present Use: Grazing 
Highest and Best Use: 
Grazing and recreational 
Improvements: Fencing, 
stock ponds, corrals 
Stock Trails: Across Wright 
property to get to grazing 
land, Thirty Five Canyon. 
See access. 
Water: Developed springs 
in Sections 21, 23, 26; spring 
in Sawmill Canyon Section 33. 
Access: On existing road 
from 1-15 frontage road across 
Wright property in mouth of 
Sawmill Canyon. 
Park City Properties 
Todd Hollow - (Porter Lease) 
Acres: 436 more or less 
Division: Each 109 
acres more or less. 
Equal in quantity and 
quality. Division into 
parcels will not decrease 
value of whole. Can be 
partitioned without great 
prejudice to owners. 
Present Use: Grazing 
(leased to third party) 
Highest and Best Use: 
Residential, recreational 
Improvements: None 
Stock Trails: None 
Water: No filed claims. 
Creek and spring, parcel 4. 
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at a point approximately 800 feet west of 
the north quarter corner of said Sec. 24, 
thence along said road making a loop to the 
left (north, thence west, thence south) 
approximately 2900 feet to another point on 
same section line of said Sec. 24 which 
point is approximately 900 feet east of the 
NW corner of said Sec. 24, thence along said 
road south-westerly across the NW 1/4 NW 1/4 
of said Sec. 24 to a point on the west 
section line of said Sec. 24, which point is 
approximately 700 feet south from NW corner 
of said Sec. 24, thence along said road 
westerly and northerly approximately 2300 
feet to the north section line of Sec. 23 at 
a point that is approximately 2300 feet west 
of the NE corner of said Sec. 23, thence 
along said road northwesterly approximately 
4 500 feet to the west section line of Sec. 
14, which point is approximately 2300 feet 
south of the NW corner of Sec. 14, thence 
along said road north-westerly approximately 
3500 feet to the north section line of Sec. 
15 which point is approximately 1700 feet 
west of the NE corner of Sec. 15, thence 
along said road northerly approximately 1 
mile to the "oil well road" which point is 
approximately 1100 feet west and 200 feet 
south of the NE corner of Sec. 10, thence 
following the center line of the Moil well 
road" which runs northerly approximately 1 
mile to a point approximately 100 feet south 
and 900 feet west of the NE corner of Sec. 
3, thence along said road around a loop to 
the right (southwesterly, northwesterly and 
northerly) approximately 2900 feet to the 
north line of Sec. 3 at a point which is 
approximately 2200 feet east of NW corner of 
Sec. 3. 
Also: 25 feet each side of a center line as 
follows: Beginning at a point 25 feet west 
of the east line of Sec. 3, T1S, R6E, SLB&M, 
which point is approximately 1600 feet south 
from north line of said Sec. 3, thence north 
parallel to and 25 feet west of the east 
section line of said Sec. 3 approximately 
1000 feet to an existing road that is 
approximately 600 feet south of the north 
line of said Sec. 3. 
51. The block designated in defendants' petitions 
as the Sawmill Property, described with particularity on 
Exhibit 59-D, can be equitably partitioned in kind by dividing 
it into four equal parcels of approximately 1284.28 acres 
each, with east-west division lines. Designating the four 
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I parcels numerically as they are shown on Exhibit 58-D 
I(map 8-P), this property can be equitably partitioned 
las follows: 
Parcel 1: Charles F. Gillmor 
The south 257 acres of the east 
half of section 33 and the 
south 513.75 acres of section 
34 and the south 514.50 acres 
of section 35, less .73 acre 
reserved to State Road Com-
I mission, of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
I Contains 1284.50 acres. 
Parcel 2: Edward L. Gillmor 
The south 323.54 acres of 
section 26, the south 323.54 
I acres of section 27, the south 
323.54 acres of Section 28, the 
north 63 acres of the east half 
of section 33, the north 125.49 
acres of section 34 and the 
north 125.51 acres of section 
35, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
I 1284.62 acres. 
I Parcel 3: Florence Gillmor 
The south 112.0 acres of section 
21, the south 112.0 acres of 
section 22, the south 111.0 
acres of that portion of 
section 23 owned by Gillmors, 
the north 316.46 acres of 
J section 26, the north 316.46 
| acres of section 27, the north 
316.54 acres of section 28 less 
the northeast quarter of the 
northeast quarter total net 
276.46 acres, and the southeast 
quarter of the northeast quarter 
of section 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
Contains 1284.58 acres. 
Parcel 4: Florence Gillmor 
The north 528 acres of section 
21, the north 528 acres of 
section 22, the north 229 acres 
of that portion of Section 23 
owned by Gillmors, T4N, R5W, 
SLB&M. Contains 1285 acres. 
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Rights to water existing on each parcel should 
accompany ownership of the surface. 
Access is available to all parcels as follows: 
Along existing road (part is only passable with four-wheel 
drive) described as follows: 
25 feet each side of a center line des-
cribed as follows: Beginning at a point on 
an existing road on the south section line 
of Sec. 33, T4N, R5E, SLB&M which point is 
approximately 450 feet west of the SE 
corner of said Sec. 33, thence northerly 
along the existing road approximately 1 
mile to the north section line of said Sec. 
33, thence northerly along an existing trail 
near the creek bottom approximately 3500 
feet to a junction of the canyon, thence 
northeasterly following an existing trail 
in the drainage of the right fork of Sawmill 
Canyon approximately 3500 feet to a point 
1000 feet north of the south section line 
of Sec. 21, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
52. The block designated in defendants' petitions 
as the Rush Valley Property, described with particularity on 
Exhibit 64-D, can be equitably partitioned in kind by dividing 
it into four parcels with boundary lines as indicated on 
Exhibit 61-D. This division will provide each party with his 
or her proportionate share of the block. Designating those 
parcels numerically as shown on Exhibit 61-D (maps 7-P), this 
property can be equitably partitioned as follows: 
Parcel 1 (one tract): Florence Gillmor 
The west half of section 27, the west 
half of section 34, the south half of 
section 26, all of section 35, the west 
35 acres of section 36 and the west 17.5 
acres of the south half of section 25, 
T5S, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres. 
Parcel 2 (three tracts): Florence Gillmor 
The east 302.5 acres of the south half 
of section 25 and the east 605 acres of 
section 36, T5S, R5W, and the west 105 
acres of the northwest quarter of section 
33 and all of section 36, T6S, R5W, 
SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres. 
60-
57. The foregoing award to each of the parties of 
the parcels of land and appurtenant rights which are subject 
to this action is the most equitable method of partitioning 
the subject properties. 
58. An Order should be entered denying all motions 
made during the trial and not ruled upon by the Court. 
59. An Order should be entered admitting all 
exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the Court during 
trial. 
60. Defendant Florence Gillmor should be awarded 
an Order of immediate occupancy of all properties and appur-
tenant rights awarded to her by virtue of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
61. Defendant Frank Gillmor should be awarded an 
Order of occupancy to commence on January 1, 1981, when his 
current leases with plaintiff have expired. 
62. Plaintiff Edward L. Gillmor should be awarded 
an Order of immediate occupancy as to all properties and 
appurtenant rights awarded to him by virtue of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Having considered the mandates of §78-39-1 
et. Beg., Utah Code Annotated (1953), the Court finds it fair 
and equitable that these properties should be partitioned in 
kind as described in the foregoing Findings of Fact, as these 
awards take into careful account possible prejudice to the 
co-owners, the quality and quantity of the various properties, 
divisibility of appurtenant rights, the preferences expressed 
by the co-owners at the trial, the equities as respects 
plaintiff's livestock operation on the one hand, as compared 
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to the rights and desires of his co-tenants, on the other, the 
value ascribed to the properties and plaintiff's return on that 
investment. 
2. The parties are entitled to an award of partition 
in kind of all the properties, except for the designated portion 
in the Findings regarding the Old Ranch, which cannot be parti-
tioned in kind without great prejudice to the owners and which 
should therefore be sold. 
3. All the properties except the portions of the 
Old Ranch designated to be sold should be partitioned in kind 
among the various co-owners as set forth with particularity in 
the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
4. The Old Ranch property should be sold in the 
manner described in paragraph 36 of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact. 
5. All motions made during the trial and not ruled 
upon previously by the Court should be denied. 
6. All exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the 
Court during trial should be received. 
DATED this day of December, 1980. 
BY THE COURT: 
PETER F. LEARY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this /jr day of December, 1980, to: 
E. J. Skeen, Esq. 
Skeen and Skeen 
536 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Clifford L. Ashton, Esq. 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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KATHLENE Tv. L0I7E 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEKLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence Gillmor 
79 South State Street 
P.O. Box 11393 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34147 
Telephone: (301) 532-1234 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
H. JAMES CLEGG 
of and for 
SNOW, CHRISTENS EM & M?\RTINEAU 
attorneys for Defendants Charles 
F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lal:e Citv, Utah 34101 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
E^W^RD LESLIE GILLMOR and SIV 
GILLMOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES F. 
GILLMOR and MELDA G. GILLMOR, 
his wife, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF PARTITION 
Civil No. 223998 
* * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
further trial proceedings following a remand from the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, before the above-
entitled court sitting without a jury, Peter F. Leary, 
Judge, presiding, commencing on the 11th day of February, 
1930 and concluding on the 4th day of March, 1980. All 
parties were present and represented by counsel, plaintiffs 
Edward Leslie Gillmor and Siv Gillmor being represented by 
A ito \ 
EXHIBIT C 
E. J. Skeen and Clifford L. Ashton, defendant Florence 
Gillmor being represented by James B. Lee, and defendant 
Charles F. Gillmor being represented by Harold C. Christensen 
and H. Janes Clegg. 
The Court having considered all the evidence, 
arguments, and briefs submitted by the parties both at 
earlier trial proceedings and at these final trial pro-
ceedings, and being fully advised in the premises, and 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav;, 
hereby makes and enters the following Order and Decree of 
Partition: 
1. The mineral rights shall not be partitioned. 
2. The block designated as the Canning property 
is hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four 
ecual parcels of approximately forty acres each with north-
south division lines and awarded as follows: 
Parcel 1: Charles F. Gillmor 
The Northwest quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 1, 
T1S, R2W, SLB&M. 
Parcel 2: Florence Gillmor 
The northeast quarter of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 1, 
T1S, R2W, SLB&M. 
Parcel 3: Florence Gillmor 
The Northwest quarter of the 
Northwest quarter of Section 1, 
T1S, R2W, SLB&M. 
Parcel 4: Edward L. Gillmor 
The Northeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 2, 
T1S, R2U, SLB&M. 
The water rights relating to the small well is 
hereby awarded to the person who receives the land upon 
which the well is located and that is as follows: 
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road" which runs northerly approximately 1 
mile to a point approximately 100 feet south 
and 900 feet west of the NE corner of Sec. 
3, thence along said road around a loop to 
the right (southwesterly, northwesterly and 
northerly) approximately 2900 feet to the 
north line of Sec. 3 at a point which is 
approximately 2200- feet east of NW corner of 
Sec. 3. 
Also: 25 feet each side of a center line as 
follows: Beginning at a point 25 feet west 
of the east line of Sec. 3, T1S, R6E, SLB&M, 
which point is approximately 1600 feet south 
from north line of said Sec. 3, thence north 
parallel to and 25 feet west of the east 
section line of said Sec. 3 approximately 
1000 feet to an existing road that is 
approximately 600 feet south of the north 
line of said Sec. 3. 
15. The block designated as the Sawmill Property is 
hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four equal 
parcels with east-west division lines and awarded as follows: 
Parce l 1: Char les F . Gillre\or 
The south 257 acres of the east 
half of section 33 and the 
south 513.75 acres of section 
34 and the south 514.50 acres 
of section 35, less .73 acre 
reserved to State Road Com-
mission, of T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
Contains 1284.50 acres. 
Parcel 2: Edward L. Gillmor 
The south 323.54 acres of 
section 26, the south 323.54 
acres of section 27, the south 
323.54 acres of Section 28, the 
north 63 acres of the east half 
of section 33, the north 125.49 
acres of section 34 and the 
north 125.51 acres of section 
35, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. Contains 
1284.62 acres. 
Parcel 3: Florence Gillmor 
The south 112.0 acres of 
section 21, the south 112.0 
acres of section 22, the south 
111.0 acres of that portion of 
section 23 owned by Gillmors, 
the north 316.46 acres of 
section 26, the north 316.46 
lir/s 
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acres of section 27, the north 
316.54 acres of section 28 less 
the northeast quarter of the 
northeast quarter total net 
276.46 acres, and the southeast 
quarter of the northeast quarter 
of section 30, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
Contains 1284.53 acres. 
Parcel 4: Florence Gillmor 
The north 528 acres of section 
21, the north 528 acres of 
section 22, the north 229 acres 
of that portion of Section 23 
owned by Gillmors, T4N, R5N, 
SLB&M. Contains 1285 acres. 
Rights to water existing on each parcel are 
hereby awarded to the owner of the surface. 
A roadway and stock trail easement is reserved 
as follows: 
25 feet each side of a center line des-
cribed as follows: Beginning at a point on 
an existing road on the south section line 
of Sec. 33, T4N, R5E, SLB&M which point is 
approximately 450 feet west of the SE 
corner of said Sec. 33, thence northerly 
along the existing road approximately 1 
mile to the north section line of said Sec. 
33, thence northerly along an existing 
trail near the creek bottom approximately 
3500 feet to a junction of the canyon, 
thence northeasterly following an existing 
trail in the drainage of the right fork of 
Sawmill Canyon approximately 3500 feet to a 
point 1000 feet north of the south section 
line of Sec. 21, T4N, R5E, SLB&M. 
16. The block designated as the Rush Valley Property 
is hereby partitioned in kind by dividing it into four equal 
parcels and awarded as follows: 
Parcel 1 (one tract): Florence Gillmor 
The west half of section 27, the west 
half of section 34, the south half of 
section 26, all of section 35, the west 
35 acres of section 36 and the west 17.5 
acres of the south half of section 25, 
T5S, R5W, SLB&M. Contains 1652.5 acres. 
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Properties shall be sold subject to easements and rights of 
way of record or enforceable in law or equity. A roadway and 
stock trail easement is hereby reserved for the benefit of the 
parties, their heirs and assigns as follows: 
25 feet each side of a line described as 
follows: Beginning at a point on an 
existing road on the south section line of 
Sec. 5, TIN, R1W, SLB&M, which point is 
approximately 900 feet west of the SE 
corner of said Sec. 5, thence following 
said road northerly and westerly approxi-
mately 1500 feet to the point where said 
existing road departs the property to be 
sold and enters Parcel 4 of the block 
described as "West of the Sewage Canal." 
Water rights and claims to be included in the sale 
are described as follows: W.U.C. nos. 2714, 3345, 3346, 3347, 
3473, 3430, 3431, 3432, 3479, 3341, 3342 and 3343. 
22. All motions made during the trial and not ruled 
upon by the Court are denied. 
23. All exhibits offered but not ruled upon by the 
Court during trial are admitted. 
24. Defendant Florence Gillnor is hereby awarded 
immediate occupancy of all properties and appurtenant rights 
awarded to her herein. 
25. Defendant Frank Gillmor is hereby awarded 
occupancy effective January 1, 1931 of all properties and 
appurtenant rights awarded to him herein. 
26. Plaintiff Edward L. Gillmor is hereby awarded 
immediate occupancy as to all properties and appurtenant 
rights awarded to him herein. 
Made and entered this s / d a y of P-Pfromhpr, ^^T 
$*~ MI 
STATE OF UTAH 36 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ' 
I. THE UNDERSIGNED, CLERK OF THE DWTRIC. 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. DC HEREBY 
CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOPEGOINQ fS 
A TRIJH AND FULL COPY OF AK O^QINAL DOCU-
MENT ON C'LE fN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLcflK. 
W1TNE3S ViY HAND AND SEAL OF SAID COUQ 
TH*S £$r" DAY Of /frJAU4T 
• QtXQNbJNDLEY, CLERK 
19 
BY '^ddjL&u '4/ftnm.rFf 
BY THE COURT: 
PETER F. LEARY ' 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
A r v :i o T 
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JAMES B. LEE 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence J. Gillmor 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1234 
H. JAMES CLEGG 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Charles F. Gillmor and 
Melba G. Gillmor 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and 
SIV GILLMOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs PROPOSED DIVISION OF 
APPURTENANT RIGHTS 
vs. 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES Civil No. 223998 
F. GILLMOR and MELBA G. 
GILLMOR, his wife, 
Defendants. 
MINERAL RIGHTS 
It has heretofore been stipulated and confirmed by 
Order that oil, gas and mineral rights will not be partitioned 
but will remain in undivided ownership. 
WATER RIGHTS AND DITCH EASEMENTS 
Defendants recommend that rights and claims to underground 
and surface waters be awarded as appurtenances of the land 
upon which such waters arise or are beneficially used. 
Exceptions: 
1. Summit County. Rights in surface waters arising 
from Dorrity Spring and Silver Creek will be partitioned 
F.YHTRTT T) 
among the parties as follows: Florence Gillmor 50%, Charles 
Frank Gillmor 25%, and Edward Leslie Gillmcr 25%. Since the 
Gillmors collectively are entitled to four days of water use 
out of each seven and one-half days, the water turns should 
be as follows: Florence Gillmor, 2 days; Charles Frank 
Gillmor, 1 day; and Edward Leslie Gillmor, 1 day. If the 
"Ninety" and the "Pace Meadow" are divided as proposed by 
defendants, each party's water right may be appurtenant to 
his or her partitioned real property. Ditch easements for 
conveyance of water to the parcels should be granted in 
existing ditches as follows: 
(a) Northeast through the center of the "Ninety"; 
(b) Northerly on the east side of and parallel to 
the Union Pacific Railroad track through the Pace Meadow; 
(c) Northerly parallel to and about 900 feet west 
of the said railroad track to the terminus of existing 
ditch at about the center of the west half of Section 
26, T1S, R4E, again serving the Pace Meadow. 
2. Salt Lake County. 
(a) An easement for the so-called "Sheep Ditch", 
diverted from the North Point Canal about one quarter 
mile east of the southwest corner of Section 15, TIN, R2W, 
SLB&M and running in a northwesterly direction through 
the SW 1/4 of Sec. 15, NE 1/4 of Sec. 16, S 1/2 of Sec. 
9, thence westerly into SE 1/4 of Sec. 8, all TIN/ R2W. 
Ownership of this easement and division of the water 
shares in the North Point Canal Company should be 
awarded to those who acquire the benefited properties 
in the West Grazing Area. 
(b) Award of remaining North Point Canal Company 
shares as benefit the irrigated property in the NW 1/4 
of Sec. 25, TIN, R1W, SLB&M. No ditch easement is 
necessary to convey the water. 
3. Tooele County. Of the Gillmor water right from 
Ophir Creek, Florence Gillmor will be awarded one-half and 
each of the other parties will be awarded one-quarter, each 
having a right to remove stock water for hauling. 
ROADS AND TRAILS 
Vehicle rights-of-way shall be two rods in width along 
existing roads, unless otherwise noted. Livestock trails 
shall be along such roads but shall include an additional 
rod on each side of 'the road, unless an owner chooses to 
fence, in which case he may fence along the vehicle right-
of-way. 
Salt Lake County 
(a) Canning Property: A new road consisting of 
the two southernmost rods commencing at 5600 West, 
easterly to the east end of the property. 
(b) 7th North Property: Seventh North (a county 
road) will serve all of the "7th North Property". 
(c) Duck Club Property: This property shall be 
served by the Duck Club Road which commences 1/4 mile 
west of the SE corner of Sec. 27, TIN, R2W, and runs 
thence northerly through said section, and continues 
northerly through Section 22 to a point approximately 
1/4 mile west of the NE corner of said Section 22, 
thence northeasterly through Section 15 to a point 1/4 
south of the NE corner of said Section 15, where the 
Duck Club Road leaves the Duck Club Property. 
Also, this property shall be served in part by the 
Island Road which originates from the Duck Club Road at 
the point where the Duck Club Road crosses the north 
boundary line of Sec. 22. The Island road then courses 
in a Northwesterly direction traversing a portion of 
the SE 1/4 of said Sec. 15, through the SW 1/4 of said 
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Sec. 15, and leaves the Duck Club Property at a point 
approximately 300' south and 1320* east of the western 
boundary line of Sec. 15. 
(d) West Lambing Range: This property shall be 
served by the Island Road which first enters the property 
at a point approximately 2000' south of the NE corner 
of Sec. 16, TIN, R2W, thence northwesterly to a point 
approximately 200' south of the N 1/4 corner of Sec. 
16, thence westerly through said section, traversing 
westerly through the northernmost portions of Sections 
17, 18, to the western boundary of Sec. 13 in the Salt 
Pond Area. 
This property shall also be served by an unimproved 
jeep road which commences at a point on the Island Road 
which is located near the N 1/4 corner of Section 16, 
running thence northerly through Section 9, to a point 
near the S 1/4 corner of Section 4, thence northeasterly 
through the southeast 1/4 of Section 4, to a point near 
the east 1/4 corner of Sec. 4, where said road leaves 
the subject property. 
(e) Salt Pond Area: This area is served by a 
continuation of the Island Road which commences at a 
point approximately 200' south of the NE corner of Sec. 
13, TIN, R3W, and traverses westerly across the northernmost 
portion of the NE 1/4 of said Sec. 13. A new road northerly 
along the east boundary of the Gillmor property will serve 
tracts north of the Island Road. 
(f) Section 31; This property shall be served by 
an existing road which enters the Ranch property at a 
point approximately 800' west from the south corner of 
Sec. 5, TIN, R1W and runs northwesterly to a point 
approximately 2000' north and 2000' west from the SE 
corner of said Sec. 5, where the road leaves the Ranch 
property and traverses westerly through the SW 1/4 of 
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Sec. 5, thence northwesterly through the north 1/2 of 
Sec. 6, TIN, RIW, to a point approximately 1320' east 
of the SW corner of Sec. 31, T2N, RIW. Said road then 
runs northerly through the full length of Sec. 31 to 
the northern boundary thereof. 
(g) Ranch Property: This property is served by a 
road, previously described in (f) above, which traverses 
the SE 1/4 of Section 5, TIN, RIW, in a northwesterly 
direction. It is also served by a second road which 
begins at a point on the previously described road, 
which point is located approximately 2000 * west and 
2000* north of the SE corner of Sec. 5, and which 
thence traverses northerly through the NW 1/4 of Sec. 
5, on through the SW 1/4 of Sec. 32, T2N, RIW. 
(h) East Amos Property: This property shall be 
served by an existing county road commonly known as 
"Rose Park Lane" which commences at the intersection of 
17th North and runs northerly along the eastern section 
line of Sec. 21, TIN, RIW, through the East Amos Property. 
(i) West Amos Property: This property is served 
by an existing county road commonly known as 24 50 West 
which abuts the western boundary line of this property. 
(j) 38 Acres Near Airport: This property is also 
served by an existing county road commonly known as 
2450 West which abuts the western boundary line of said 
property. 
(k) Pine Crest Property: This property shall be 
served by an existing road which enters the property at 
a point approximately 1320' south of the NE corner of 
Sec. 28 TIN, R2E, running thence southwesterly through 
the S 1/2 of the NE 1/4 of Sec. 28 to the quarter line 
of said section where this road terminates. This 
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property shall also be served by a new road which 
commences at the beginning of the existing road and 
runs southwesterly to a point on Brigham Fork near the 
south 1/4 corner of said Section 28. Also, a new road 
which begins on the E-W 1/4 line of said Sec. 28 where 
the existing road terminates, and runs along 6050' 
contour line in a westerly direction into the NW 1/4 of 
said Sec. 2 8 where it terminates. 
Summit County 
(a) Todd Hollow: Use U.S. 40. 
(b) Clark Ranch: An existing road entering the 
Gillmor property at the NE corner of SE 1/4 SE 1/4 Sec. 
2, T2S, R4E, thence southerly to junction in NE 1/4 
NE 1/4 Sec. 11. Branches (1) west across N 1/2 N 1/2 
Sec. 11 and (2) southerly to leave the Gillmor property 
at about one quarter mile west of the SE corner of 11, 
T2S, R4E; also existing connection road from about one-
eighth mile south of NE corner NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and running 
southwesterly to connect about three-eighths of a mile 
north of the center of Section 11. Also, a new road 
commencing at aforementioned junction and running 
southeasterly to the NE corner of the SW 1/4 NW 1/4 of 
Sec. 12 and continuing southeasterly across Gillmor 
property. 
(c) Ninety: Served by U.S. 40A (S.R.248) and by 
old U.S. 40A, now re-routed. No easements necessary. 
(d) Quarry Property: Cross easements not necessary, 
all proposed parcels having access to public roads. 
(e) Pace Meadow: Access by existing county road 
parallel to and east of Union Pacific Railroad track. 
Also, existing haul road parallel to and west of Silver 
Creek. 
(f) Sixth East: No cross easements necessary. 
(g) Seventh East: Access to Gillmor property by 
existing South Fork Chalk Creek Road. New roads to be 
surveyed where required to provide access to each 
owner. 
(h) Saw Mill Canyon: Existing road up Sawmill 
Canyon, northerly through center of E 1/2 Sec. 33, 
T4N, R5E, thence northeasterly through NW 1/4 NW 1/4, 
Sec. 27, S 1/2 Sec. 22, thence southeasterly through 
SW 1/4 Sec. 23 and southerly through E 1/2 Sec. 26, 
all T4N, R5E. 
(i) Tooele County: Existing roads with respect 
to property south of Deseret Chemical (South Tooele 
Army Depot), as needed to reach individual allotments. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May, 1977 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
By U/l/^f 4 ? X^Ll— 
James B. Lee 
At torneys for Defendant 
Florence J . Gillmor 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By ' / . ( < ^ ^Y ~~~^~ 
H. James Clegg<? 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Charles F. Gillmor and 
Melba G. Gillmor 
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JAMES B. LEE 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence Gillmor 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: 532-1234 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and 
SIV GILLMOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES 
F. GILMOR and MELBA G. 
GILLMOR, his wife, 
Defendants. 
PETITION RELATING 
TO PROCEDURE TO BE 
FOLLOWED IN PARTI-
TIONING LAND 
Civil No. 223998 
Defendants, by and through their attorneys, James B. 
Lee of Parsons, Behle & Latimer and H. James Clegg of 
Worsley, Snow & Christensen, representing ownership of three 
quarters of the property to be partitioned, request the 
Court to reject the Referees' Report and adopt the procedure 
described below with respect to partitioning the land in 
question. 
Defendants petition the Court to segregate the land 
into fifteen separate blocs, each to be divided into four 
equal parcels. They further petition the Court to designate 
which of those parcels should be distributed to each of the 
property owners in accordance with their property interest, 
cross easements to be awarded all parties to provide tradi-
tional means of access to each tract. 
The fifteen separate blocs would be as follows: 
EXHIBIT E 
1. Canning Property; 
Division -- Divide into four 40 acre tracts in accord-
ance with the cadastral survey. 
2. 700 North Property 
Contains property in Sections 25, 26 and 27 (E 1/4), 
T. 1 N., R. 2 W. 
Division — Divide into four tracts of equal acreage, 
each having frontage on 7th North Street. (Old Saltair 
Highway). 
3. Duck Club Area: 
Property in Sections 11, 14, 15, 22 (N 1/2) and 23 
T . 1 N . , R. 2 W. 
Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal acreage 
in such way that each of the parcels will have marsh front-
age for recreational (duck hunting) use and the division 
lines run east-west. 
4. West Grazing Area: 
Contains property in Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 16 and 
18 T. 1 N., R. 2 W. and that portion of Section 3, T. IN., 
R. 3 W. south of the Goggin Drain. The property in which 
the Gillmors own an undivided 1/2 interest and Irvine owns 
the other 1/2 interest would not be included. An effort 
should be made to sell the Gillmors' interest to Irvine or 
to Duck Club members. 
Division -- Divide the area into four separate parcels 
of equal acreage. 
5. Salt Pond Area: 
Includes lake front property in Sections 1, 12 and 13 
(north of Goggin Drain), T. 1 N., R. 3 W. 
Division — Divide into four parcels of equal acreage 
so that each parcel will have lake frontage, division lines 
to run east-west. 
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6. Ranch Property: 
Division --
(a) Divide Section 31 into four parcels of equal 
acreage, with division lines running north-south. 
(b) Divide the balance of the property into four 
parcels as follows: 
(1) The old ranch including buildings and 
improvements. 
(2) The improved and irrigated ground on the 
south side of the property contiguous to 
the Jordan River and west parcel watered 
by pump. 
(3) Balance of the property east from the 
sewage canal. 
(4) Balance of the property west of sewers. 
7. 17th North - Rose Park Property: 
Division, -- Divide into four parcels with equal footage 
along 1700 North Street as extended eastward across Redwood 
Road. 
8. Amos Property: 
Division -- Divide property into four parcels of equal 
acreage? East-West from Rose Park Lane. 
9. 2450 West Property: 
Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal size, all 
fronting upon 2450 West Street. 
10. Emigration Canyon: 
Division --
(a) The lower property will be deemed 1/4 of the total. 
(b) The Little Mountain property will be deemed 1/4 of 
the total. 
(c) The Pine Crest property to be divided into two 
parcels of equal acreage which shall be assigned 1/4 each. 
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11. Park City Properties: 
Division --
(a) All water rights flowing from land on which it 
arises including Silver Creek, Dority Springs and United 
Park water to be divided 1/4 to Edward Gillmor, 1/4 to 
Charles Gillmor, and 1/2 to Florence Gillmor. 
(b) Clark Ranch plus 90 acres immediately south from 
the railroad to be allocated 1/2 and to be awarded to Florence 
Gillmor. 
(c) Quarry property plus Porter lease (Todd Hollow) 
property to be designated as 1/4. 
(d) The Pace Meadow property to be designated 1/4. 
12. 7 E - Chalk Creek Property: 
Division -- Divide into four parcels of equal acreage. 
13. 6 E Property: 
Division --
(a) Use Elk Horn Ridge as a dividing line cutting the 
property roughly in half. 
(b) Divide north half a north parcel and a south parcel 
of equal acreage. 
(c) Divide the south half into an east parcel and a 
west parcel of equal acreage. 
Each of the parcels will be designated 1/4. 
14. Saw Mill Property: 
Division -- Divide the property into four parcels of 
equal acreage with division lines running from east to west. 
15. Rush Valley: 
Division --
(a) Determine total acreage and divide into four par-
cels of equal acreage — to the extent feasible, property 
within each parcel to be contiguous. 
(b) Divide the A.U.M.s equally into four parts. 
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If the Court accepts this procedure, the defendants 
propose that maps be prepared by Sumner Margetts Company 
illustrating fifteen separate blocs and dividing said blocs 
into portions as above set forth. 
Defendants submit that this procedure would be in ac-
cordance with the Partition Statute (Chapter 39 of Title 78, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended). Further, defendants 
believe that this procedure would be the most efficient and 
economical one that could be followed by the Court and, 
more importantly, the most equitable. 
DATED this / - '• 'day of June, 1976. 
'dA*Uj fa 7 u X 
JAMES B. LEE 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence Gillmor 
jf. VJAM£# CLEGG 
of-and for 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Charles F. Gillmor and 
Melba G. Gillmor 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Petition Relating to Procedure to be Followed in Partitioning 
Land to Mr. H. James Clegg, Worsley, Snow & Christensen, At-
torneys for Defendants Charles F. Gillmor and Melba G. Gillmor, 
Seventh Floor, Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 84101, and to R. C. Skeen, Skeen & Skeen, Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs, 536 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84102, 
t n i s
 ^ _ _ L daY o f June, 1976. 
r 
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OCT 
JAMES B. LEE 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Florence J. Gillmor 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-1234 
H. JAMES CLEGG 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Charles F. Gillmor and 
Melba G. Gillmor 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 5 21-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
EDWARD LESLIE GILLMOR and 
SIV GILLMOR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
FLORENCE GILLMOR, CHARLES 
F. GILLMOR and MELBA G. 
GILLMOR, his wife, 
Defendants 
Defendants move the Court to view the easements 
as items of continuing jurisdiction. It is anticipated 
that the number of necessary roads will decrease as 
properties are awarded because Florence Gillmor will 
acquire in some instances both dominant and servient 
tracts, making declaration of easement unnecessary. 
Further, defendants move that easements be awarded 
on a dominant-servient basis and only to a party 
needing such easement. Party A may need an easement 
across Party B's tract to reach his own. Absent other 
compelling reason, there is no need to award Party C 
an easement if his property lies in another direction 
EXHIBIT F 
r:
 3 > "I '7] 
MOTION 
Civil No. 223998 
and is served by a different access. 
With respect to location of new roads, the recom-
mendations of a surveyor may be essential and it may 
be necessary to amend or modify the Decree as information 
becomes available to do equity between and among the 
parties. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of May, 1977. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
smut BJ*Zs $_ 
s B. Lee 
torneys for Defendant 
lorence J. Gillmor 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
7
 ^ /.-> 
, o-By ^ \, L > Z>-^____ 
J ^ >• w 5 
H. Jame^Clegg 'S 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Charles F. Gillmor and 
Melba G. Gillmor 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I served copies of the foregoing Motion 
and copies of Proposed Division of Appurtenant Rights 
upon Messrs. Rex J. Hanson and E. J. Skeen this 18th 
day of May, 1977. 
H. James Clegg 
